Basing Palestinian Social Policy on Human Development and Welfare Mix

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Introduction

As Palestine goes through a transitional period towards establishing the state of Palestine, the Palestinian leadership is requested to work on two simultaneous goals; first runs a governance process that serves the people's wellbeing during the transitional period and second successfully lays the foundations for the coming state. These two goals have a dialectical relation and should be addressed in a way that gives full attention to each of them as if the other is fully achieved; work for people's wellbeing as if having a state and work for building the aspired state as if people's wellbeing is achieved. The success of this process is, to a large extent, determined by the social policy adopted by the Palestinian National Authority. The overall social policy and the derived sectorial and localized social policies in different aspects of life are determined by the vision and strategies adopted by policy makers who draw the framework of such a process. This paper suggests a vision for the required policy in light of the historical and political context of the situation in Palestine. The suggested vision is built on partnership in development. The partnership is among the different sectors in socio-economic life as presented by the welfare mix. The sectors participating in this partnership are: the state (public), the private, the non-governmental (NGOs), and the kinship. That partnership can launch a sustainable human development process that can attain both mentioned simultaneous goals. The paper discusses the potentials of each sector to be active member in this partnership, in addition to the obstacles faced in utilizing these potentials. The paper concludes that this approach is possible despite the difficulties and presents a number of recommendations that help in its successful adoption and implementation.

Historical and Political Context

By signing the declaration of principles (known as the Oslo Accords) in September 1993 at Washington D.C between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian national history moved into a new phase. Despite the controversy on this event, and its limited sovereignty nature compared to the self-determination and complete independence, there was a majority that supported taking the approach of taking this opportunity to start building the future independent state and collecting all potentials needed for such a state to emerge out of the Palestinian Authority (PA) stated in the accords

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as a transitional period. On the eve of establishing the Palestinian National Authority (PNA, as named by Palestinians adding 'National' to PA) and after it was established², an expansive wave of initiatives started to outline and design the public policy and specific policies of the new authority. These efforts (which ranged between brainstorming by think tanks, technical committees and working groups for certain fields) focused on how to shape the future of the coming state. This was seen by many Palestinians as an important step towards their long waited self-determination through nation-building, as well as a step towards achieving a just and lasting peace. To ensure the possibility of success in both national independence and regional peace, two major achievements are needed; fulfilling Palestinian's great expectations of raising their standard of living, and laying the foundations of good governance that can lead a sustainable development (Diwan & Shaban, 1999; SHDP, 1997). The institutional infra-structure of the PNA consists of two major types of institutions. The first type consisted of those institutions inherited from the Israeli military occupation administration to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) according to the agreement on transfer of powers and responsibilities, and included major services like education, health and social affairs. The other type of institutions consists of those new ministries and other public institutions created by the PNA itself or by the PLO in its preparation for the transitional period. In addition to new ministries, many institutions that are necessary for planning and policy-making were created, like the Palestinian Council for development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and its hosted Forum for Social and Economic Policy Research in Palestine, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen Rights (PICCR). These policy and planning institutions worked closely with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC, later became Ministry of Planning after establishing a separate Ministry for Foreign Affairs) to lead the development process.

Despite the severe restrictions imposed on it by the Israeli occupation and the consequences of the continued conflict after failing in reaching an agreement in the final status negotiations, the PNA's successive governments acted as a government of a state. The PNA plans show that it worked to achieve what governments of states in the contemporary world can achieve. As Giddens (1998:47) reiterates and summarizes, government in the contemporary world exists to:

- provide means for the representation of diverse interests;
- offer a forum for reconciling the competing claims of these interests;

² According to Oslo Accords 1993, PNA was formed as a 5-year transitional body which leads to the final status solution to be negotiated. According to the Accords, PNA has control in both security and civilian issues in urban areas (called Area A) and only on civilian issues in rural areas (Area B), while Israel kept full control on the rest of areas (Area C).

- create and protect an open public sphere, in which unconstrained debate about policy issues can be carried on;

- provide a diversity of public goods, including forms of collective security and welfare;

- regulate markets in the public interests and foster market competition where monopoly threatens;

- foster social peace through control of the means of violence and through the provision of policing;
- promote the active development of human capital through its core role in the education system;

- sustain an effective system of law;

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- have a directly economic role, as a prime employer, in macro- and microeconomic intervention, plus the provision of infrastructure;

- more controversially, have a civilizing aim- government reflects widely held norms and values, but can also help shape them, in the educational system and elsewhere;

- foster regional and transnational alliances and pursue global goals.

The PNA is working to achieve this list of roles and responsibilities and lead a process of development and reconstruction in an environment similar to that which characterizes post-conflict countries as they rebuild the state and move toward democratization (Qazzaz, 2007), in addition to the continuous economic, social and political deteriorating environment. This environment is linked with the very difficult daily life of 4.5 million Palestinians living in WBGS, with a 2.9% rate of natural growth (2.59% in WB and 3.41 in GS) and about 39% living in poverty and deep poverty (about 40% in GS and about 20% in WB) (UNDP, 2015; MAS, 2007c). In leading such a process of development, the PNA faces essential questions related to the formulation and implementation of public and social policies on the national level. The following questions, asked by Giacaman, Jad & Johnson (1996: 13), exemplify such questions:

Will the PNA focus primarily on the coercive and policing functions of a state- as in post-colonial societies elsewhere in the developing world- leaving the development of social policies and services to international aid and NGOs? Or will it play a central and active role in determining the social rights of individuals and groups? Will the social policies and programs be constructed on the concepts of citizen's rights and universal entitlements, or through notions of charity?

I think that answering such questions should be done by making use of the newcomer's advantage; learning from the mistakes and successes of others (Diwan and Shaban, 1999), as well as making use of international experiences in post-conflict reconstruction to guarantee the democratic nature of policies underlined in these questions by adhering to Reconstruction National Integrity System (RNIS)³, for example (Qazzaz, 2007). Human Development as defined by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) offers a democratic participatory vision for the required social policies, while the Welfare Mix (Dean, 2006) approach to welfare pluralizes sources that achieve human wellbeing. Therefore, adopting

³ The RNIS provides a framework through which to assess the impact and legacies of conflict, the multiple political and institutional issues, and the role of donors, not only generally in terms of reconstruction, anti-corruption development, and priorities, but also in terms of the often complex and continuing issues of power, corruption and democratization.

Human Development as a broad framework to policy formulation and implementation with Welfare Mix as a way of diversifying resources will guarantee a democratic nature of the process on the one hand and will enable the state to build a partnership with other important actors pluralizing resources for a sustainable development process on the other. This requires "an agreed upon development perspective that can guide the performance of all society's institutions, as well as a resolute, persistent, and professional leadership possessing the means of guidance and control and which is entrusted with the responsibility for modernization, planning, and follow-up" (DSP, 2004).

In the coming parts of this paper, I'll discuss the relations between Social Policy, Human Development, and Welfare Mix; discuss the specificity of Human Development in Palestine- its potentials and obstacles; and the role of each of the Welfare Mix sectors contributing in Human Development with special focus on the NGOs sector.

Social Policy, Human Development, and Welfare Mix

Human wellbeing is considered the ultimate goal of Social Policy as a field of study. This field focuses on the social policy/policies as well as the on social relations and the system that makes this wellbeing possible and sets the conditions for its achievement (Dean, 2006). Human history, however has witnessed as many interpretations of wellbeing as many ideologies and branches of ideologies that looked at human beings, society, and the universe. The capitalist perspective of wellbeing is different than that of socialism for example, and at the same time the different manifestations of capitalist perspective of wellbeing has changed with time as a reflection of many competing factors. These changes were the results of internal and external interactions for capitalist social policies (Dean, 2006:22). These can, in turn, be considered as part of the nature and crisis of capitalism "that cannot coexist *with*, neither can it exist *without*, the welfare state" (Jessop, 2002:172).

The meaning of human wellbeing and what it entails may be less controversial compared to the policies that determine how it can be achieved. Planning to achieve human wellbeing on different levels (international, national, provisional, or local) can be designed in either a negative way (eradicate poverty, decrease unemployment rates, end exclusion, etc.) or in a positive way (increase income, increase services, improve education, etc.). Regardless of the way in which the targets are formulated, which sometimes reflects a certain ideological approach, wellbeing can be outlined in a nearly agreed upon list of areas of

concern to target the "five giants" of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness (Dean, 2006). These five giants were "translated", in a language that suits today's world, into 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as defined by UNDP (2003), and later by 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as defined by UNDP (2017).

The SDGs came as a follow-up to the MDGs that were an ambitious translation of UN Millennium Declaration. They were also a milestone in the continuous efforts of Human Development that started 1990 and "placed human wellbeing and poverty reduction at the center of global development objectivesan approach advocated by *Human Development Report* since its inception" (UNDP, 2003: 27). MDGs and SDGs (Box 1) are clearly based on Human Development understanding of wellbeing that is largely different from earlier approaches of economic growth to development or just economic wellbeing. According to Sen (2000), despite the fact that income can be used as the material basis of wellbeing, there are variation between incomes and advantages that we get from them. This variation originates from the following sources: personal heterogeneities, environment diversities, variations in social climates, differences in relational perspectives, and distribution within the family.

Human Development, as expressed by UNDP, is the international face of the desired social policy that is capable of targeting human wellbeing on individual and collective levels. Bringing a Human Development perspective to social policies can be understood as a rights-based approach. This approach emphasizes diversifying resources to be utilized for targeted wellbeing (Giacaman, Jad & Johnson, 1996; UNDP, 2004) in a way in which people "have to be seen as being actively involved in shaping their own destiny, and not as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs" (Sen, 2000: 53). The first Human Development Report of 1990 (quoted by McMichael, 2000:3) put it thus:

The basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of people's choices to make development more democratic and participatory. These choices should include access to income and employment opportunities, education and health, and a clean and safe environment. Each individual should also have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy human, economic and political freedoms.

This approach, in its nature, is in line with recent developments in many European countries, known as the "Third Way". This is defined as when welfare state structures are giving way to a welfare-mix consisting of the state, kinship solidarity, NGOs sector and private sector (Dean, 2006; Abela, 1999; Jenson, 2003; Giddens, 1998; Vogel, 2000; Ilcan & Basok, 2004). The survival of the welfare state "depends on its ability to shift its concern from the redistribution of economic resources towards the development of preventive measures and participative social projects between agencies of the state,

families, self-help groups, communities and other non-government organizations" (Abela, 1999:522).

Dean's (2006) description of the roles of the three other non-state sectors can be summarized as follows:

- The informal sector: receiving day-to-day human services from the families and communities in which one lives. These services can be better seen and their importance felt in cases like community based care for the disabled or elderly people.

The voluntary sector: This sector includes organizations like religious bodies, charity organizations, mutual aid societies, and trade unions. The roles of these organizations differ from one country to another, but usually include social protection, health care and education. These roles are usually in parallel or supplementary to state services.
The private/commercial sector: The roles of this sector are usually in one or both of two: providing services that are bought by state to be delivered to people and financing social services as a sign of social commitment.

Through this perspective, social policy is seen as interrelated with human rights, democracy, and good governance. Correspondingly, development can be seen as the present international context of social policy. Therefore, critical analysis is needed to the concepts and ideological approaches of policy as well as the practices of development (de Haan, 2007). This implies the essentiality of the "interaction between formulation and implementation of social policies on the one hand and democratization and empowerment on the other" (de Haan, 2007:8). The Human Development Report 2000 (quoted by Dean, 2007:4) makes this clear through the following links

"human development requires economic growth, rights require democracy; and both require a pluralistic and largely de-politicized public realm in which non-governmental organizations and civil society groups can play a role as much as the state. It is claimed that economic, social and cultural rights are as important as civil and political rights".

Empowerment and participation are two major pillars for guaranteeing both the diversity of resources as well as giving a real meaning to rights, by bringing "an emancipatory concept and practice of development, in which inequalities and inequities are addressed together" (Connell, 1997;248). In doing this, people are given the right to "have a say" in the meaning of their wellbeing and in its realization (Breton, 1994).

Human Development in Palestine

Palestinians' interest in development, in its general meaning, goes back many years before the establishment of the PNA and before developing the concept of Human Development in the sense presented by UNDP. In 1981 and 1982 the Conference on Development in the Service of Steadfastness, that was organized in Jerusalem by the Arab Thought Form, concluded that "the success of any development program for steadfastness, to a large extent, depends on a clear political vision which.... aims at finding a fair and permanent solution to the [Palestinian] problem" (quoted by SHDP, 1997: 17). Before the establishment of the PNA, such efforts for development were led by the PLO, which acted for a long time as state surrogate in exile, in cooperation with the political and social movements (Brown,

2003). Palestine joined the Human Development "club" in 1996 by establishing the Sustainable Human Development Project (SHDP) hosted by Birzeit University and supported by the UNDP. This step was considered important by PNA, the donor countries and the international funding institutions like the World Bank. These groups joined efforts in many programs focusing on development, to launch a development process that consolidates the peace process that just started when it started (Diwan and Shaban, 1999). SHDP aimed at establishing an institutional and policy culture based on Human Development that could be "internalized" in the Palestinian decision-making and policy formulation and implementation. The first publication of SHDP was a Human Development Profile (referred to hereafter as the Profile) in order to lay the ground for starting producing Human Development reports like other countries. The Profile considered "the right to regain the development initiative from the Israeli Occupation Authority" (SHDP, 1997: 7) as one of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. A wide ranging debate focused on the concept of development in Palestine as well as on development priorities and the most appropriate mechanisms for the application of these priorities. Despite the differences in opinion from the different sides, it was agreed on the necessity of "halting the continued deterioration of the quality of life" and the adjustment of the concept of development in Palestine "to reflect the necessity of reconstruction" (SHDP, 1997: 7). Throughout the successive Human Development Reports (SHDP, 1997; DSP, 2000; DSP, 2003; DSP, 2005, UNDP, 2015), the concept of development in Palestine crystallized towards a Human Development based on empowerment, participation and partnership. The concept was adopted by the PNA as can be clearly seen in many documents as well as in Human Development reports (sees Box 2). The implementation of this concept by the PNA and its performance in consistency with it are questionable in the light of the reports about the integrity, transparency and accountability of PNA's institution (Qazzaz, 2007).

The Palestinians face a challenge of developing visions and strategies of Human Development (Cole, 2001) that can help in achieving a number of goals, in a continuous spiral process that utilizes the results of each stage as feedback for the next stage. These goals are: to overcome the results of the dedevelopment⁴ process that continued for three decades of direct occupation, to overcome the current obstacles facing this development, with special stress on obstacles of internal sources and not only those

⁴ De-development is a process done by forces that seek to disrupt the development process by preventing society from using its political and economic potential, and by preventing rational structural transformation of the society through indigenous means. (SHDP, 1997: 8)

linked with Israeli occupation measures and policies, and to make optimal efficient utilization of available potentials and resources.

The challenges (problems, complexities and weaknesses) that faced the Palestinian development process at the beginning of PNA efforts (SHDP, 1997; Diwan & Shaban, 1999) have not only continued, but increased and intensified after the second intifada in 2000 and the Israeli counter measures. These challenges can be summarized in the following:

- The continuous intervention of Israeli occupation in Palestinian affairs due to the three zones of authorities and powers (A, B and C). This intervention became limitless after invading A areas.
- The PNA assumed responsibilities in many fields without having the proper organization, and the interruption of its efforts to improve its structure due to the continuation of Israeli invasions.
- Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources, especially water, and its drastic effect on agriculture.
- Asymmetric market relations with Israel, which include Israeli's full control of Palestinian import and export activities with the world and on Palestinian labor in Israel.
- Israeli continuous policy of land confiscation and settlements expansion.
- The large destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, especially that of PNA facilities, during Israeli military attacks.
- The over employment in the public sector (the masked unemployment phenomenon) that was used to solve unemployment and to reward political allies of PNA leadership.
- The PNA's gradual loss of credibility due to reported corruption, which affected popular support as well as international support to the PNA.
- The developments in Gaza Strip, where fundamentalist Hamas assumed full power through a military coup.

(DSP, 2003, DSP, 2005, Qazaz, 2007)&&

Despite these serious challenges, there are strengths, potentials and resources that can lead to a successful Human Development in Palestine. If utilized properly through the right environment and right mix of strategies and policies (Diwan & Shaban, 1999; SHDP, 1997), these strengths can be summarized in the following:

- Human resources: The high quality of these resources as reflected by education averages, the availability of professional skills, and the accumulated experiences of the Palestinian Diaspora.

- Newcomer's advantage: The possibility of learning from similar experiences in nation-building after independence and post-conflict situations.
- The Arab and international solidarity and support expressed in funding Palestinian development projects as well as PNA budget.
- The relative success of building Palestinian institutions and the relative success of reform efforts towards good governance.
- The relative strength of social fabric, as a major source of social capital.
- Availability of a strong civil society movement and the advanced experiences accumulated by its organization in leading development under occupation, as well as the degree of their involvement in promoting transparency and accountability.
- The inherent justice of the Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination and having the support for that from an overwhelming majority of international community.

The role of the NGO sector in Human Development

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It is almost unanimously agreed upon that the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) voluntary sector -the third sector as contrasted with the governmental and private sectors- is vital to every community. In Canada, for example, organizations of this sector

provide a wide range of essential services and programs that touch virtually all aspects of societysocial justice, human rights, environment, health, faith, arts and culture...These organizations help establish the connections among citizens, communities and governments that build social capital and sustain democracy (Scott, 2005:14).

In developing countries, the role of these organizations is very essential to the promotion of civil society and its institutions and promoting democratic change. The importance of this role multiplies many times when taking into consideration the "unusual" environment in Palestine characterized by political, social and economic instability, and the exceptional importance of establishing the values of civil society in the emerging state and in relation to its contribution to Human Development (Jarrar, 2005; Qazzaz, 2007; MAS, 2007a; MAS, 2007b; Brown, 2003; Shawa, 2000; Salem, 1999).

Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) include different forms or types of organizations. The typology of these organizations depends on many factors: founding social power, targeted group/s, location, objectives, etc. Due to the large number and diversity of these organizations, the 12 major activity groups of the

International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO)⁵ (Salamon & Anheier, 1996) can be applied fully to the PNGOs.

The development of these NGOs since 1967 was influenced by interacting social and political factors related to the life under Israeli occupation as well as by the establishment of the PNA late in 1994. This development was determined to a large extent by the national struggle to achieve self-determination, and later by their struggle for establishing a civil society after the establishment of PNA. Therefore, national movement parties, factions and organizations played a principal role in this development (both positively and negatively) and determined to a large extent the PNGOs' structures, goals, strategies, models and relation with their members and communities served (Salem, 1999; Brown, 2003). The development of PNGOs went through major stages that are marked by major events in the last 40 years of Palestinian history and the subsequent characteristics of these organizations in each stage. PNGOs began in the British Mandate period as welfare organizations, starting on religious, and gradually on social, basis, and developed as a full-blown sector after 1967 occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) (Sullivan, 1996). MAS (2007a) mapping study defined the following stages for the distribution of NGOs establishment according to year of establishment: 1949 – 1967 (7% of the organizations were established in this period), 1968- 1979 (9.9%), 1980- 1987 (7.9%), 1988 – 1993 (12.4%), 1994 – 2000 (33.7%), and 2001-2007 (26.8%).

PNGOs' history and their wide and deep involvement, which will be detailed later, and the high relative public trust in them compared to other sectors (DSP, 2005), provide a sufficient clue of the important role that they can assume in the Palestinian Human Development. Moreover, they will help "strive not only to maintain a service-delivery role, but to participate in policy-making on a national level." (Giacaman, Jad & Johnson, 1996:12). The optimum utilization of this role is dependent on the government's policy to facilitate it, as well as on the readiness of both sides to cooperate in a constructive way avoiding the conflict and competition witnessed in many instances.

As the Palestinian Human Development Report 2004 (DSP, 2005: 137) concluded:

The NGO sector has a long history of activity in the development process. Its accumulated experience can be tapped in order to develop realistic visions of development. The role of the Palestinian NGO sector should complement the role of other sectors, taking into consideration the special role of some NGOs in being catalysts for change and promoting human rights.

⁵ These activity groups are: culture and recreation; education and research; health; social services; environment; development and housing; law, advocacy and politics; philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion; international; religion; business and professional associations; and Not elsewhere classified. (Salamon & Anheier, 1996)

To coordinate this role and work for its realization 92 Palestinian NGOs working across a broad spectrum of humanitarian, social and developmental fields, was established in September 1993 as a network to work as an "independent civil and democratic entity (...) to support and strengthen the principles of democracy, social justice, sustainable development and respect for human rights within Palestinian society" (DSP, 2005: 98). In specific, Shawa (2000) thinks that for NGOs to be development agents, they need to do the following: provide services, represent the poor and disadvantaged, and be partners of the states. The ability of PNGOs to have this distinct role in Palestinian Human Development can be clearly seen by reviewing their following profile.

PNGOs profile

Coverage: MAS (2007a) mapping study of PNGOs shows that they are distributed according to their objectives into 13 categories that covers almost all aspects of life and cover all administrative geographical divisions of WBGS, as shown in tables 2 and 3. Sullivan (1996: 94) mentioned that by the mid-1990s, PNGOs provided up to 60% of primary health care services, nearly 50% of hospital care, 100% of disability care, 100% of all agricultural extension, and about 30% of educational services, including almost all kindergartens and day care centers. In the 1998-1999 Human Development Report (DSP, 2000) it was noted that the geographic distribution is disproportionate with poverty distribution. In utilizing the PNGO resources, the distribution of services can be adjusted to the needs of development plans that are drawn to implement social policies in different fields. Such adjustments can include asking experienced NGOs who work on the national level to cover new districts for certain services. Adjustments can also include inviting different NGOs who have duplications in services to coordinate in order to save the resources lost in duplication.

Budgeting and resources: The total amount of revenues received by PNGOs in 2006 is about US\$ 223.5 million, received from different sources. As per 2006 data, 46.8% of PNGOs receive external funds (from Western and Arab sources), 81% of them have self-fund as part of their budgets, 13.4% of them receive funds from the PNA, and 62% of them receive local donations. This can be translated in per capita income of \$56.6 (MAS, 2007a). These resources will increase significantly in quantity and in importance when estimating the value of voluntary work invested in PNGOs projects and activities, as these organizations have a total of 53,622 volunteers (MAS,2007a).

Beneficiaries: According to MAS (2007a) mapping study of PNGOs in WBGS, the number of beneficiaries in 2007 rose to 11 million. This number seems unrealistic, but it can be understood when beneficiaries include number of cases served by PNGOs, projects and activities as well as those who benefited from research and infrastructural development projects in which whole communities can be considered beneficiaries. Even if these figures got reduced to cancel this duplication of served cases and other such factors, the number of beneficiaries will still be significant to the welfare of people in WBGS. The importance of these services increases in light of the fact that even before the deterioration of the situation since 2000, it was realized that if the "PNGOs lose the ability to serve the communities that have come to depend on their services, the PA remains unable (in short term) to replace them" (Sullivan, 1996:96).

Staffing: The PNGO sector employs around 20,000 employees. This number changed with time and was affected by the closure and funding received by the organizations. Sullivan (1996) mentioned that the NGO sector employees 20,000-30,000, with an average staff of 20 per NGO. This number was, according to MAS (2007a) mapping study, about 17000 employees most of them in charitable organizations (68%), development organization (16%) and training/rehabilitation organizations (4%). These numbers show the importance of the sector as an employer, in addition to its importance as a provider of services and its role in the dissemination of democracy and civil society principles.

Accountability: A majority of PNGOs evaluate their programs periodically (MAS, 2007b), this can be attributed to the development of the organizational structure of the organizations or to the requirements of funding agencies who support these organizations. Some PNGO coalitions have their main activities in promoting accountability in all Palestinian sectors, for example AMAN- The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity. AMAN invited major active PNGOs to work on formulating and issuing the Code of Conduct for Palestinian NGOs, which was completed and signed by a large number of PNGOs. In its introduction, the Code stresses on the role of PNGOs in "the process of development as well as in the work towards liberation" and continues "in order to fulfill that goal, Palestinian NGOs find it necessary to commit to principles and values that are closely tied to good governance and democracy, and that are supported by competence, effectiveness and professionalism" (AMAN, 2007a).

PNGOs-PNA relations

PNGOs' relationship with the PNA oscillates between cooperation and partnership in carrying out services in different fields on the one hand and competition and conflict on the other (Sullivan, 1996; Hammami, 2000, MAS, 2007b). On the cooperation side of the relationship, PNA was in need of the accumulated

field experiences of the NGOs along the years of occupation, as well as to make use of the resources and external funds given to the NGOs. There are good examples of the cooperation between the two sides such as the partnership in the national commission for poverty alleviation and in the cooperation to produce Palestine human development report (DSP, 2005). The conflict side of the relation stemmed from the competition of the two sides on the outside financial support (Arabic and international) and the desire of the PNA to regulate the work of NGOs in an authoritarian form. The conflict reached its peak when the PNA's Ministry of Justice proposed a law that restricts NGOs registration and work, which the PNGOs faced with large campaigns and succeeded in changing different articles in the law (DSP, 2005). Legally, the PNGOs' work is organized by the "Societies and Domestic Institution Law" issued in 2000 and the executive charter issued by the government in 2003. Despite the fact that the law and its charter were based on the right of NGOs to work freely and to secure legal guarantees for their freedoms, the PNA is accused by NGOs of having double-standards in favor of NGOs close to PNA political parties (MAS, 2007b). After a number of incidents in which the PNA interfered in PNGOs to limit and control their activities, and PNGOs reacted in protest campaigns and lobbying, the Ministry of the Interior adopted a number of measures and principles to bridge the gap between the two sides. These measures and principles included coordination, facilitating registration of organizations, banning Palestinian security from entering organizations without authorization from the minister, and seeking synergies in the work of organizations with ministries in the same field (DSP, 2005: 100).

The Role of the Palestinian Private Sector in Development

When the PNA was established and high expectations were seen by the majority of Palestinians in WBGS, economists were engaged in discussing economic policy for the new regime. The general tendency was towards a western- style economy, built on the assumption that a sovereign independent Palestinian state will come into existence in WBGS. Among the key recommendations to such a state, was to "adopt a non-discriminatory trade regime" and to "adopt an economic strategy geared to modern knowledge-based global economy" (Cobham and Kanafani, 2004). This approach to development in Palestine was criticized as inappropriate to the situation in Palestine, even before the deterioration of the situation to what it looks now (Cole, 2001). In the current situation, the private sector suffers as a result of the restrictions caused by Israeli closure of WBGS, but life goes on and business has to go on adapting to the realities.

The partnership between public and private sectors is needed for the interest of both, and more importantly for the national interest in self-determination and independence without which both interests will be

extremely harmed. This partnership of the public and private sectors is not associated only with the current situation, it is also considered appropriate in many developed countries, were the economic liberal argument on social policy is contrasted with new arguments favoring this kind of partnership in the framework of a welfare mix. Liberal argues that "free markets in human services represent the most efficient and cost effective form of provision, provided that some kind of residual safety net is provided for those who simply cannot pay", while in the public-private partnership suggested through welfare mix "private sector companies are involved jointly with the state in financing public service infrastructure or in managing human service delivery" (Dean, 2006: 115).

Policy makers have to build on the hopes of regaining the situation that started after establishing the PNA, which was interrupted by the Israeli restrictions after the second intifada in 2000. The PNA adopted positive attitudes towards the private sector and tried, through a number of steps, to create an investment-friendly environment, but those steps may not necessarily totally meet the aspirations and interests of the private sector. The investment encouragement law of 1998 attracted new investments and caused an increase in the number of registered companies and an increase of 57% in the value of projects that were approved the next year, the majority of these projects was foreign investment. These positive attitudes of the PNA must be met by private attitudes and steps that reflect the responsibility of the private sector in promoting development in Palestine. The partnership between the public and private sectors should include three main elements: clear principles of cooperation, business relations in service providing, and social responsibility of the private sector. (DSP, 2000; DSP, 2003; DSP, 2005; UNDP, 2015).

In May 2000 a discussion forum was organized between the two sectors that made a number of recommendations regarding the relationship between them, among those recommendations:

- Enacting economic laws, especially funding laws, with the participation of the private sector in an effort to bolster the role of the private sector as a catalyst of Palestinian economy.
- Limiting bureaucracy in the public sector and working to establish clear lines of authority in order to prevent unnecessary administrative intervention.
- Activating the rule of law and improving the functions of Palestinian courts of law, especially concerning trade and financial matters.
- Organizing Palestinian trade relations with Israel to protect the Palestinian private sector from Israeli economic control and working to activate trade agreements signed with several Arab countries.
- Guaranteeing cooperation between public and private sectors in establishing a national plan to market Palestinian merchandise and working to establish trade centers and offices abroad to market products and attract foreign investment to Palestine.
- Working to restructure the Palestinian tax system (Value Added Tax and Income Tax) to encourage private sector investment.
- Prohibition of monopoly in either sector unless clearly justified for national or economic reasons.

(DSP, 2003: 47)

On the level of business relations between the two sectors, the PNA canceled service units and departments that are not cost effective and purchased these services from the private sector. These services include maintenance services to public facilities and infrastructure. The PNA also continued purchasing unavailable public services, especially in medical care services, from the private sector.

On the level of social responsibilities of the private sector, many Palestinian private companies established units or assigned a staff to follow up this aspect. The Palestine Human Development Report 2004 (DSP, 2005) mentioned the following contributions of the private sector as examples of "Points of Light" in the Palestinian development process:

- Palestine Telecommunications Company (PALTEL) has adopted the concept of corporate social responsibility by creating community partnerships with local institutions to promote creativity and excellence. Activities included funding youth centers, buying olive oil from farmers, providing scholarships to university students, and covered costs of medical treatment of needy individuals.
- The Arab Bank offers financial and in-kind assistance to cultural and educational institutions and provides financial aid to thousands of university students.
- The National Beverage Company funded two children's libraries in two governmental hospitals and donates large quantities of school supplies to schoolchildren annually.

The private sector joined efforts towards establishing integrity and transparency in public life, especially in protecting the public's interests against fraud and corruption in stock exchange. This will be reflected on investment environment and economic growth. For example, the Palestine Securities Exchange had recently issued a number of regulating documents in this aspect, like; Listing Regulations, Disclosure Regulations and Code of Professional Conduct in Stock Market (www.p-s-e.com).

The Role of the Palestinian Informal Kinship Sector in Development

In the Palestinian society, traditional and modern trends of social life coexist in different aspects of life. Feudal relations in social life, expressed in the great influence of tribes and clans, can be seen side by side with most modern industrial and trade capitalist relations expressed by electronic stock market exchanges. Also, informal judicial systems of disputes arbitration and court system can still be seen mainly in rural areas coexisting with the formal judicial systems (Taraki et al, 2007). Traditional networks through kinships and communal associations, like tribes, clans, families, and *Diwans*⁶, have great influence through their "systems and mechanisms, habits, traditions, laws, symbols and ritual celebrations of

⁶ Diwan is an association (usually with a meeting place center) that brings together members of the same cline or tribe, or people of the same original place of residence before refuge in refugee camps.

holidays and the seasons, which hold great emotional appeal and a sense of belonging for its members" (DSP, 2005:92). These networks constitute an important safety net for all members in facing emergencies, and especially in supporting the disadvantaged members. The informal sector consists of groups that are self-funded through religious and social donations and common property revenue. These institutions provide an unwritten social contract that helps maintain social cohesion, and thus contributes to the social capital needed for Human Development (DSP, 2005). This role increases in importance in times of difficulties and hardship. During the second intifada, for example, as the feeling of insecurity and vulnerability increased among Palestinians, there was an increase in awareness of "the importance of family ties and of internal social solidarity as a last means of providing security, protection and basic needs" (MAS, 2007b). This informal support phenomenon is a product of socio-economic relationships which "individuals weave among themselves within society for the mutual exchange of various interests in times of need...that might take the form of grants, financial aid, gifts, or material help or service such as work" (Hilal &EI-Mailki, 1997:3).

A study of the informal social support systems in WBGS perceived "the different support relationships prevailing within the Palestinian society in the WBGS as one of the essential factors in the regeneration of this society and its resistance to poverty and marginalization" (Hilal & El-Malki, 1997:1). The study shows that such systems do not have only positive and collaborative aspects, but they also have negative effects. Therefore, planning to utilize the informal sector, as part of the welfare mix, in Human Development should take both sides into consideration. The positive and collaborative aspects of informal support systems are witnessed in the improvement in life of those who benefit, especially in cases when support targets long-term improvement, as well as in the positive social relations, especially the feeling of unity among people in difficult situations. The informal support takes the following forms:

- regular kinship financial assistance inside the family or clan, or on religious/charity non-kinship basis,
- assistance in services, like: grandmothers caring for working mothers' children, help in harvesting, help in house maintenance, etc.,
- assistance in kind, like: food supplies, clothes, building material, etc.,
- participation in hamula (clan) funds, as these funds are used to help those members of the clan in need, especially in case of social occasions and to support university education,
- participation in saving associations, especially the rotating benefit arrangements, usually in workplaces and among residency neighbors,

- informal support credit through interest-free loans from kinship or friends,
- financial support in social occasions, like in wedding, child birth, sickness, death, etc.

(Hilal &El-Malki, 1997; author's experience)

Despite the positive outcomes of this sort of informal support, there are negative aspects that are associated with modern social relations, in contrast with the traditional social relations underlying this support, such as the following:

- personal deference to the donor, which reduces the recipient's personal independence and reinforces clan loyalties instead of reinforcing social and public awareness,
- the intermingling of special emotional kinship relationships with those of reciprocal material interests,
- possible increased burdens of young families,
- limiting the professional and geographical mobility for members of the family.

(Hilal & El-Malki, 1997: 86)

The informal support's importance will largely increase if it is used as part of a multi-sector cooperation. One example of this support comes from my experience in directing the Community Service Center (CSC) in Nablus (www.najah.edu/centers/csc). In CSC, we built a voluntary group called the "Good Will Forum" that works as a channel between those who like to donate and those who are in need. The donors complained that their assistance is not used to impact a continuous change in the life of recipient families (sometimes relatives) while they think the help can have such impact. Donors also felt provoked in cases where assistance is used to buy luxurious goods like a cellular rather than used for essential things. CSC proposed a developmental approach that included matching the assistance from other sources, which we approach, when it is used for purposes of long term impact like improving housing environment of the family or starting a micro-business. The approach succeeded in many cases and is adopted now as a major option in the activities of the Good Will Forum.

The informal support forms are very important in implementing programs of family-based or communitybased nature. For example, the Community-Based-Rehabilitation (CBR) program launched by a coalition of Palestinians NGOs working in the disabled rehabilitation field. In such programs, informal support is a very essential component. Without it the partnership of the other sectors will not be possible or will be very difficult. (see appended case -Ahmad Aqraba).

Conclusion

The ideas and issues surrounding Human Development in Palestine have clearly been responses to events and realities of its people, and served as survival strategies to overcome difficulties and hardships. The wide awareness on participatory development that was created through different discussion forums, among the several actors shaping economic and social policies, reinforced these forms through practice. As a result of this, it can be concluded that the different sectors in socio-economic life in Palestine are eligible to be partners in a Welfare Mix relationship and can contribute to the aspired Human Development process in Palestine. The role of the state is very essential in this partnership on two levels: fulfilling its own role in good governance and service providing on the one hand, and to facilitate the roles of the other sectors on the other. On the first level, the state has to review existing policies and modify them according to the principles of Human Development and Welfare Mix as well as to formulate new policies accordingly. Also the state has to activate the integrity system to guarantee transparency and accountability to face corruption in public sector. On the second level of state's role, the following recommended guidelines can lead to optimum utilization of the potentials of the three other sectors in the Welfare Mix.

In relation to the NGO sector, the PNA is recommended to:

- Regulate NGOs work on the basis of the right to association as an undisputed human right, with judicial regulation to protect public interests in NGOs activities and encouraging their accountability,
- Coordinate activities to end duplication in fields served by both public and third sector,
- Coordinate to end unconstructive competition between both sectors on outside funding,
- Purchase certain services from NGOs when it is more cost-effective than providing them by state,
- Utilize the accumulated experiences of NGOs, especially in development planning and human rights watch.

In relation to the private sector, the PNA is recommended to:

- Regulate economic activities based on economic pluralism,
- Encourage, through proper incentives, private sector social responsibilities,
- Purchase certain services from the private sector based on cost-effectiveness,
- Take proper possible measures to protect national industry from unfair competitions caused by the situation under occupation.

In relation to the informal sector, the PNA is recommended to:

- Raise awareness towards positive aspects of traditional social relations, that underline the role of this sector, in media,

- Coordinate social services between social affairs ministry and kinship and community social structures,
- Encourage informal sector's roles in care giving by value-matching the available help.

These recommendations as well as the perspective behind them need to be translated into policies in all aspects of life to crystallize the proposed vision.

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Appendices

Box 1

a: UN Millennium Development Goals

What are MDGs?

The eight MDGs- which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the date of 2015- form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions. They have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest.

The Goals:

- 1- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,
- 2- Achieve universal primary education,
- 3- Promote gender equality and empower women,
- 4- Reduce child mortality,
- 5- Improve maternal health,
- 6- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases,
- 7- Ensure environmental sustainability,
- 8- Develop a global partnership for development.

(www,un.org/millenniumgoals, 2/11/2008)

b: UN Sustainable Development Goals

What are the Sustainable Development Goals?

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), otherwise known as the Global Goals, are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity.

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These 17 Goals build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals, while including new areas such as climate change, economic inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice, among other priorities. The goals are interconnected – often the key to success on one will involve tackling issues more commonly associated with another. They are:

No Poverty; Zero Hunger; Good Health and Well-Being for people; Quality Education; Gender Equality; Clean Water and Sanitation; Affordable and Clean Energy; Decent Work and Economic Growth; Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; Reduced Inequalities; Sustainable Cities and Communities; Responsible Consumption and Production; Climate Action; Life Below Water, on Land; Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions; Partnerships for the Goals

(http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html, 20/11/2017)

Box 2

Minister of Planning and International Cooperation forwarding Palestine Human Development Profile 1996-1997:

• Human development constitutes one of the necessary foundations for the development of people to move towards a better future. Palestine, which is moving from a stage of occupation to a stage of independence, must adopt this concept and work towards its implementation.

(SHDP, 1997: forward)

Parts of the Ministry of Planning address at the conference to launch the Human Development Report 2004:

- The report offers a development-based, empowering vision for Palestinian individuals and society under a set of very complex external and internal conditions...In spite of this, there are hundreds of points of light shining from the initiatives of individuals, groups, governmental organizations and NGOs.
- The Ministry of Planning has worked to consolidate and shape national development plans. When the situation was averse to crystallization of long-range plans, as a result of the extraordinary and unforeseen conditions brought about by the Israeli aggression, the ministry created contingency plans and labored to restore economic and social stability to prevent further deterioration. Recently with various development partners (the public sector, private sector, and civil society), the ministry formulated a development vision making the people the target and the generators of the development process and linking aid and development.

The framework for national economic development stated that it

• aims to pursue intensive and participatory discussions among various stakeholders leading to the identification of the specific policy issues which must be addressed on the road to national economic development for all citizens of the future Palestinian State.

• allows the PNA to identify conditions and actions necessary for realizing the overarching national economic development vision in an inclusive and participatory manner. The frame work provides a general context for discussions and agreements on different and intertwined policy priorities and outcomes, potential policy conflicts, trade-offs and it points out to difficult choices entailed by economic modernization and social transformation that should be made in the future.

(The Ministry of National Economy, 2004:6)

From the Executive Summary of Palestine Human Development Report (PHDR) 2004: Among PHDR aims, it aims to:

- Provide an objective Palestinian perspective of empowerment as a basis for achieving development and independence on the cumulative experiences of the Palestinian society.
- Increase active participation in policy- and decision-making at all levels of Palestinian society.

Among PHDR general recommendations, it recommends:

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- The need for the empowerment vision to arise from recognition of the negative effects of Israeli occupation, along with the need to seriously address internal obstacles and challenges.
- Aligning the development agenda with the priorities of Palestinian society by involving all sectors of the society, especially the private and NGO sectors, in setting this agenda.
- Viewing empowerment as cumulative and sustainable process linked to every sector of society rather than a temporary, separate, and independent process.

(PHDR, 2004)

EMPOWERMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT:

The Palestinian context is different from that of most states. For, apart from the formidable challenges which any meaningful empowerment agenda elsewhere in the world has to contend with, the task is rendered virtually impossible in Palestine, where the Israeli occupation inherently presents a dominant force for disempowerment – both directly, given its highly oppressive nature and the capriciousness and arbitrariness of its instruments of intervention in virtually all facets of Palestinian life in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, and by retarding and vastly complicating any national effort aimed at attaining however modest a degree of empowerment that can be attained in spite of the occupation.

(UNDP, 2015)