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Faculty of Graduate Studies**

# **Implicature in Simultaneous Interpretation**

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**This Thesis is Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Applied Linguistics  
and Translation, Faculty of Graduate Studies, An-Najah  
National University, Nablus, Palestine**

**2018**

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate my humble work

To my father and my mother

Whose love, encouragement, support and prayers of days and nights make me able get such honor.

To Dr. Sufyan Abuarrah

The great professor who I will always be indebted to.

To my friends

Who answer the call for help without hesitation.

## **Acknowledgment**

First and foremost, praise is to Allah who supports me with strength and determination to achieve this work.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Sufyan Abuarrah for his support, creative suggestions and guidance. My words will not be enough to express my deep appreciation for what I have learned during this work.

I would also like to thank my teachers who were the example to follow during my study at An-Najah University.

In addition, I would like to extend my thanks to my colleagues and friends who I have had the pleasure to be with during my MA study.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my family for their great help and support.

## الإقرار

أنا الموقع أدناه، مقدم الرسالة التي تحمل العنوان:

## المعنى الضمني في الترجمة الفورية

## Implicature in Simultaneous Interpretation

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## Declaration


The work provided in this thesis unless otherwise referenced, is the researcher's own work, and has not been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualification.

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**List of Abbreviations**

<b>Q</b>	<b>: Quantity</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>: Informativeness</b>
<b>M</b>	<b>: Manner</b>
<b>SI</b>	<b>: Simultaneous Interpreting</b>
<b>PCI</b>	<b>: Particularized Conversational Implicature</b>
<b>GCI</b>	<b>: Generalized Conversational Implicature</b>
<b>CP</b>	<b>: Cooperative Principle</b>
<b>AIIC</b>	<b>: International Association of Conference Interpreting</b>



**Implicature in Simultaneous Interpretation****By****Thaher Mohammad Gharabah****Supervisor****Dr. Sufyan Abuarrah****Abstract**

This research looks into implicatures interpreting in simultaneous interpreting. Implicated meanings constitute part of the message that interpreters should convey in order to communicate the original message adequately. The simultaneous interpreting process is challenging due to its oral immediate nature; moreover, implicated message poses extra challenge for the process due to the fact that implicatures are meant rather than said. This thesis aims to identify the challenges that simultaneous interpreters face during interpreting implicature. In addition, the research seeks to identify the misinterpretations of implicatures and its impact on message conveyance. Also, the study aims to look into the elements that can aid interpreters in implicature interpreting. The research follows the descriptive and the analytical approaches. The descriptive approach is used in the identification of the factors that affect interpreting implicature in simultaneous interpreting. The analytical part of the research includes the analysis of practical examples that encounter implicature in simultaneous interpreting by applying Levinson's Heuristics of meaning (Q, I and M). The most crucial challenge by the interpreter was found to be in grasping the implicated message itself. Interpreters can overcome such a challenge in two different ways; firstly the interpreter should expand his/her linguistic knowledge and the knowledge on pragmatic function of

the implied meanings. Considering Q-heuristic, interpreters should reflect the level of strength used in the source text. Such reflection will be located in the choice of the appropriate equivalence for the source language form. In the I-heuristic, which is the most challenging heuristic due to the fact that it is not related to certain expressions or forms, interpreters need to provide the exact amount of the original linguistic forms provided by the original speaker. This enables the audience to find a base to amplify the original message and reach the implicated message. The challenge in M-heuristic is located in the interpreters' identification of the marked form and the situation it indicates. Secondly, the interpreter should hold sufficient background on the extralinguistic elements of the simultaneous interpreting process. That is, the encyclopedic knowledge of interpreters, their cultural background and their sociocultural background constitute part of the basic knowledge that interpreters should hold. The study recommends that the training of interpreters should focus on the linguistic frame; that is, the interpreter need to have training on implicatures' pragmatic function, as one of the fundamental conditions of SI success.

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 Background**

#### **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

#### **1.3 Aim of the Study**

#### **1.4 Questions of the Study**

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

#### **1.6 Methodology**

#### **1.7 Layout of the Study**

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 Background:**

Simultaneous interpreting (SI) before 1920 was not systematic. As Bermann and Wood (2005:51) put it “at various times interpreters have served as missionaries, liaison officers, military envoys, court interpreters, business couriers and trade negotiators”. According to Gaiba (1998), SI can be traced back to 1920. The new tendency to use other languages than French, as the source language of education and diplomacy, forced the birth of SI as we recognize it today, probably without the equipments that are available today, but the process we recognize now started at that point of time. The first world war stands as the main reason behind the onset of SI. Pöchhacker (2016:29) states that “the Paris peace conference following World War I marks a fundamental turning point in the history of interpreting – and of diplomacy”. The exclusive usage of French language was interrupted by the need of other diplomatic groups, especially English speaking ones, to communicate in languages other than French. In 1926, the first patent of SI equipment was given to Gordon Finley at IBM. An announcement of a new age, where SI importance is realized, began.

According to Bermann and Wood (2005:52), the first school for interpreters was opened in Geneva in 1948. The need for trained interpreters increased rapidly, beyond the need of interpreting a trial or

insuring the success of a meeting. Schools kept showing up, as in Moscow 1962, to set down a new age where SI becomes a part of communication. With technical development, SI found its way to the world faster and in a more effecting manner. In other words, technology eased the SI itself by improving technical devices used in SI. Technology wide-spread and the amount of engendered interaction obliged audio- visual media to encounter the usage of SI as a modern method of facilitating conferences.

According to Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002:6), “it was not until the mid1980s, however, the materials for spoken- language interpreting in community setting began to appear, independently from each other in different places”. SI became a profession with special courses and training. The massive interaction and communication force the SI to the front as one of the basic channels of communicating message to audience through media. Generally, interpreting can be defined according to Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002:3) as “interlingual, intercultural oral or signed mediation, enabling communication between individuals or groups who do not share, or do not choose to use the same language(s)”. (see 3.1 for more details on SI).

During the development of SI, particularly in 1975, the English philosopher Herbert Paul Grice introduced the concept of implicature. Based upon the cooperative principle, which is a description of how people engaged in a conversation should act, implicature is engendered by the usage of Grice maxims. Grice maxims constitute rules to follow in order to

obtain the cooperative principle. Flouting a maxim would generate a new unstated meaning, known as conversational implicature. According to Huang (2017:27) Grice (1975) defines conversational implicature as “a set of non-logical inferences which contains conveyed messages which are meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense”. Moreover, the role of implicature can be observed evidently in its contrast with semantic meaning; while semantic meaning provides the surface meaning that vocabulary and syntax impart, conversational implicature goes deep underneath what is said to identify what is meant without being stated by linguistic expressions.

Implicature or implicated meaning may appear in any conversational occurrence or in any SI situation. The implicated meaning recovery constitutes a challenge for the simultaneous interpreter in two ways. The first way is related to the fact that implicature is there in the spoken discourse; however, to what limit is the interpreter allowed to go deep and make the implicit explicit? Setton (1999:10) discussed the cognitive pragmatic analysis of the simultaneous interpretation and stated that "translation aims to make the same explicatures and implicatures available to its addressees". Obviously, the implicature or implicated meaning recovery by the interpreter is necessary, even fundamental, for the addressee's comprehension. Setton (1999) added that "the interpreter must form a representation of the speaker's intended meaning at one remove from linguistic forms" (p.10). What Setton suggests here is that the

implicated meaning existence within the source language must be conveyed even though it is not explicitly stated by linguistic forms.

The second way relates to the simultaneous interpreter's ability to comprehend what is implicated. Chernove (2004) stated that "Comprehension depends on adequate analysis of the content of the message, not as it is expressed explicitly, but also its concealed, implicit component" (p.57). Message comprehension, according to Chernove, has two sides, the comprehension of what is explicit and of what is implicit. Diriker (2004) suggests that "professional interpreters underline that SI implies the maximum transfer of the ideas and opinions in the original in an intelligible manner and underscore the importance of complete identification between the interpreter and the speaker "(p.42). As stated, the simultaneous interpreter job is to reach the maximum level of the original message transference in order to obtain the highest level of message conveyance and comprehension by receivers.

Taking into consideration the interpreter's cognitive ability, intuition, experience, background and the interpretation process limitations like time and speed, can the interpreter render implicated meaning adequately? And if not, how would that affect the intended meaning of the original text on one hand, and the audience comprehension on the other hand? In this research, the researcher will attempt to answer the previous questions by examining simultaneous interpretation of implicated meaning. The thesis aims toward examining challenges that face interpreters considering

implicature. The research will look into the factors that can affect implicature interpretation. Moreover, the research intends to examine the impact of misinterpreting implicature on the whole message conveyance.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem:**

Whether written or spoken, the non-stated meanings by producers create a challenge in understanding the implicated meaning by receivers. Implicature constitutes extra burden for SI interpreter. In SI, interpreters are expected to convey the original message adequately; that is, interpreters need to include every idea whether explicated or implicated. The conveyance of implicatures may trouble the interpreter for reasons related to time constraints, cognitive abilities, linguistic abilities, lack of training and others. The interpretation of the original message may not succeed if the interpreter fails to realize the implicated meaning, and as a consequence, the original message's content would be inadequately interpreted or even lost. SI interpreter would fail to fulfill his/her task if he/she does not include all of the factors that affect implicature interpreting. Interpreter's realization of related factors would aid him/her in capturing and interpreting the implicated meaning.

## **1.3 Aim of the Study:**

This thesis will examine interpreting implicated meaning in SI and how it is possible for an interpreter to communicate the intended meaning without being held responsible for what the speaker implies. The first aim



of the research is to identify the main challenges that face the interpreter during the SI process and how interpreters can overcome such challenges. The second aim is to identify the impact of misinterpreting implicature on the content of the original message in SI process. Finally, the research is going to examine the related factors, linguistic and extralinguistic, that may affect implicature interpreting and could help the interpreter in fulfilling his/her task of implicature interpreting, and identify the most influential element.

#### **1.4 Questions of the Research:**

- 1- What are the main challenges that face simultaneous interpreters during the interpretation process considering implicated meaning? What kind of skill do interpreters need to have in order to overcome such challenges?
- 2- What is the impact of misinterpreting implicated meaning on the original message content and target language audience?
- 3- What are the elements of the source text that interpreters should include to interpret implicature in SI?

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study:**

The study significance lies in the coinage of pragmatic phenomena, implicature, to SI. As implicature constitutes an extra challenge to the comprehension of a discourse, whether written or oral, it is taken to another

higher level of confrontation when it is related to simultaneous interpretation.

The thesis relies on retrieving examples of implicature misinterpreting, which would be retrieved from speeches of recognized dignitaries. Exemplification adds more significance to the thesis which tries to study the practical conveyance of implicature in SI. Moreover, the research will look into the factors that affect implicature interpreting in order to include in the analytical approach. What signs more significance to this research is the lack of studies which concern the same matter in the same way.

### **1.6 Methodology:**

The researcher will be able to answer all the raised questions and to reach the anticipated results through employing the descriptive and the analytical approaches. In the descriptive approach, Implicature is going to be examined for its categorization by scholars such as Grice (1975), Horn (2004) and Levinson (1983,2000) in order to follow a certain categorization of implicature in the analytical approach of the study. Descriptive approach will be adopted in the identification of the factors that affect interpreting implicature in SI.

The analytical part of the research will include the analysis of practical examples that encounter implicature in SI. That is, the discussion on implicature will be supported by providing examples which are going to

be taken from *YouTube*. Examples will be retrieved from the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu speech in the American Congress on May 24, 2011 and the former American president Barak Obama final speech in the Congress on Jan 12, 2016, in addition to the recent American president Donald Trump speech for his first State of the Union address on Jan 30, 2018. Examples will be attentively considered to identify implicature's misinterpretation and its effect. Both of the source discourse and its interpretation are going to be scripted for later analysis when a misinterpretation occurs.

### **1.7 Layout of the Study:**

The research is divided into six chapters which further sub-categorization as follows:

**Chapter One** consists of six main sections that are considered as a preface to the whole study. The study begins by providing a brief background on the involved concepts. After that, the problem, aim, questions, significance and methodology of the study are presented.

**Chapter Two** introduces the main claims of the previous writings on the research topic. Literature review provides a summary of other works' hindrances and achievements that are related to the topic of this study.

**Chapter three** constitutes a theoretical background of SI and implicature. A background into Implicature's background is necessary in order to identify the different definitions of the pragmatic phenomena and

the different categorizations of implicature. Chapter three also identifies the challenges that interpreters face during SI.

**Chapter four** aims to identify the linguistic and extralinguistic elements that can aid the researcher in his analytical approach of the study. The elements are extracted from the review of previous models of interpreting.

**Chapter five** deals with the practical analysis of the retrieved examples. In this chapter, an analysis of the misinterpretations will be carried out to identify any instances of misinterpretation and their impact on the original message.

**Chapter six** includes the conclusions and recommendations offered.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review**

#### **2.1 The interdisciplinarity of SI**

#### **2.2 Implicature in Translation and Interpretation**

#### **2.3 Implicature in practice**

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review**

This section is devoted to the related studies that deal with implicature in SI. The section is short due to the scarcity of studies related to implicature in SI process.

#### **2.1 The Interdisciplinarity of SI:**

In the 1980s, a new interest in SI studies began. As a field of study, many researchers made enormous contributions to the field of SI regarding theoretical and practical discussions of various aspects related to SI. SI study did not attract linguists and translators only, but also it became an interesting topic for psycholinguists and sociolinguists. Such interest impacts the study of SI and its relation to other fields. According to Garzone and Viezzi (2002:2):

Since its early stages the “young” discipline of interpreting research (SI, my addition) has found itself, by necessity, at a crossroads between several different sciences ..... it had to borrow some of its instruments of analysis from other sciences mainly psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics and translation studies.

The overlap between SI and other fields of study affected SI studies where its focus becomes centered around the mental and cognitive aspects of the interpretive process. Such interest has great value in the study of

related phenomena to SI like the education and training of SI interpreters. It can be stated that the focus on the cognitive aspects of SI has a major role in the enrichment of the concept and content of SI.

The focus on cognition in SI affected the example choice and analysis of SI process; that is, the focus was not on the input and output as on the way that input is processed to produce output. Notice that this discussion does not attempt to criticize the focus on cognition in SI, since SI is a cognitive process itself. According to Schwieter and Ferreira (2017:445) “research into cognition in interpreting set out from conference interpreting and, more specifically, simultaneous interpreting, because any type of interpreting, be it spoken or sign language, involves simultaneity of different cognitive process”. Yet, a criticism can be signed for the huge concentration over cognition on other disciplines’ expense. The cognitive aspect role therefore is undeniable; however, the focus of this study will be on the product of SI. Such focus is related to linguistics rather than cognition. According to Chernov (2004:72):

inferences made by the hearer from extralinguistic sources (cognition, situational and pragmatic) are a powerful tool for comprehension. We may safely assume that in the absence of such sources, comprehension would always be incomplete, defective and deficient.

What Chernov suggests is that SI as an interactive and communicative process has other sources than cognitive ones. Interpreters

adhere to other fields, as linguistic, to obtain an adequate comprehension of SI process. According to Marmaridou (2000:53), in her consideration of cognition, “it (cognition, my addition) sheds light on how the mind works and how experiences relate to our conceptual system”. Cognition is the centre of understanding the way our minds work; especially when it comes to language processing. Most of the reviewed studies take the cognition of the interpreter as a starting point for SI study. The importance of cognition study in this research lies in identifying the reason(s) that stand behind the misinterpretations during SI process. Although the research focus is on the output of the SI process, the research does not ignore any factor that may aid in identifying the misinterpretations causes.

Chernov considers pragmatics along with cognition as two extralinguistic sources of comprehension that help in message conveyance. However, pragmatic phenomena like presupposition and implicature were studied for the illustration of some cognitive aspects.

Consecutive interpreting and SI share the property of oral nature. In her consideration of courtroom consecutive interpretation, Berk-seligson (1990:197) stated that “interpreting training programs should look into linguistics in general, and to the field of pragmatics in particular, to sensitize persons entering the profession as to the multiple ways in which they can jury”.



## **2.2 Implicature in Translation and Interpretation:**

Before I discuss implicature in translation and interpreting, I should illustrate translation and interpreting differences in order to understand the way each process deals with implicature. Translation origins can be traced to the first century BC where Cicero and Quintilian started the debate over sense- for- sense or word- for- word translation of Latin orations. Since then, translation went through a great number developments that contributed to translation as a field of study. Interpreting on the other hand is a recent discipline that we can trace back to 1920s.

Pochhacker (2004:51) considers interpreting studies as a part of the wider field of translation. Such consideration by Pochhacker is supported by translation scholars' in studying interpreting as a sub-field or even a secondary one. Pochhacker (2004:52) states that "translation scholars have mostly defined their object in the narrow sense, as limited to the written medium, and have seen a little need to fit their models and methods to interpreting".

Translators' tendency towards dealing with written texts was supported by their belief in the elusive nature of interpreting as a process; that is, language in written texts is fixed and more convenient to study than the oral discourse. The distinct nature of written texts in translation and oral discourse in interpreting constitutes the main challenge to deal with.

Pressure, limited time and lack of available resources in the immediate nature of interpretive situations make interpreting out of translation scholars' interest until 1990s. According to Pochhacker (2004:52), in the early 1990s "influential approaches to (written) translation, including concepts like target- text function (skopos) and translation norms, began to be explored in the field of interpreting". Although some scholars like Vermeer (1984), Holmes (1978) and Toury (1978) showed an interest in interpreting, the interpretive process was considered in the fields of psychology and sociology more than in translation studies (Pochhacker: 2004).

Later, even after implicature became a more complicated phenomenon to resolve, it was considered mainly in written scripts. In other words, implicature was regarded in translation rather than interpreting. The point that I want to make here is that translation and interpreting have different accounts for implicature because of the difference in the essence of the processes. Implicature comprehension and delivery in translation can be grasped by resorting to other writings or a professional consult, but interpreters do not have such pleasure due to the immediacy of the oral interpretive situation.

The conveyance of implicature in an immediate situation, without any supporting material and in the regular speed of talk flow, creates extra challenge for SI interpreters. The analytical process by the translator, in SI,

requires more efficiency, training, cultural and linguistic abilities due to the lack of supporting sources in the immediate SI of implicature.

The audiences of the written script are not the same of the oral discourse. The readers of translated work may resort to other resources or translations to comprehend the written text's explicit and implicit meanings. However, listeners have the interpreters' words as the only resource of information. In such case, the audience of the interpreter is restricted to the his/her immediate interpretation.

### **2.3 Implicature in Practice:**

In 1975, the British philosopher Grice firstly introduced the concept of implicature. It was noticed that implicature was considered, in most of the reviewed works, according to Grice maxims. (for more details see section 3.3).

The contributions of Grice to pragmatics, especially in implicature, are valuable. Yet, the neo-Griceans researchers, Horn (1984, 2004) and Levinson (1987a, 2000), have provided new categorization for implicature. Although Grice set the basic principles for implicature, other researchers, such as Green (1989), Mey (1993), Davis (1998) and Lindblom (2001), contributed to the pragmatic phenomena. The categorizations of implicature provided by neo-Griceans were not considered in practical studies of implicature as Grice's categorization.

In 1998, Jacobsen investigated implicature in Danish courtroom. Although Jacobson investigated implicature in consecutive interpreting, his investigation is valuable due to the shared oral nature of consecutive interpreting and SI. The investigation looked into implicature theory and the strategies that interpreters applied in the courtroom. With reference to court room interaction, Jacobson (1998) stated that

This perception is reflected in ethical guidelines which instruct court interpreters to deliver absolute verbatim versions of source texts. Clearly, pragmatic meaning cannot survive such requirement, and yet pragmatic meaning is central to courtroom interaction where questions and answers are not always entirely explicit and strait forward (as cited in Gerzymisch-Arbogast, 2003: 145)

The nature of courtroom interaction requires more than pragmatic meaning transference. In other words, the pragmatic meaning may not serve the intended or implicated meaning of the conversational situation. Court room interpreting is critical for both the culprit and the accused, it can be a matter of life or death.

Jacobson resorts to Grice's Co-operative Principle and categorization of implicature. Jacobson examined Grice's maxims and pointed out that if the speaker failed to observe a maxim, the audience would not take the non-observance of a maxim as irrelevant. Rather, the audience would look for another interpretation. Therefore, Jacobsen distinguished eight

strategies that simultaneous interpreters can adopt in implicature interpreting in courtroom and provided examples that can support his strategies. The first strategy is to interpret the semantic content only. In this strategy, the ambiguity of the original utterance is preserved and left for receiver(s) to infer implicature. In the first strategy, the responsibility of capturing an implicature depends on the receivers' abilities.

Jacobsen provided an example for the first strategy, which is to interpret the semantic content only, where a speaker avoids the usage of the weaker, less informative form, which is the full answer, and uses "yes", which can provide the maximum amount of information. Jacobsen explained that such a case is the result of a conflict between quantity and quality maxims. The speaker sacrificed the quantity maxim, by saying just "yes", for quality maxim by saying exactly what is in his mind, which is the full answer. The second strategy is to interpret part of the semantic content only. Implicature inferring is preserved for the receivers. Moreover, such a strategy is used if omitting part of the semantic content makes the implicature more easily available, i.e. when a speaker provides a maximum amount of information, instead of using a simple (yes/ no) answer. Such act reveals the flouting of a maxim; Jacobsen provided the next example:

A: Did you go with C to see Schindler's list on the night in question?

B: I rarely miss a chance to see Liam Neeson. I think he is really good.

The interpreter: I rarely miss a chance to see Liam Neeson.

The interpreter omitted the second part of B's response because it just elaborates on the information in the first sentence. Also rendering the second part obscures the implicature. The third strategy is to interpret the semantic content and explicate the implicature. The original utterance's ambiguity will be preserved, but implicature will be explained; that is, the interpreter will make it apparent to the receiver how the ambiguity is to be interpreted. For example:

A: Did you buy the car and the motorbike?

B: I bought the car.

The interpreter: I bought the car, I didn't buy the motorbike.

While B provides less information than required, the interpreter explicates the implicature as an addition from his/her side. The fourth strategy by Jacobsen is to interpret part of the semantic meaning and explicate the implicature. Such strategy is used if the interpreter wants to explicate the implicature, but the explication makes part of the semantic meaning redundant. Jacobsen provided the next example to illustrate the strategy:

A: Did you buy the car and the motorbike?

B: I bought the car. That's right.

The interpreter: I bought the car, I didn't buy the motorbike.

The interpreter leaves the second part of B's utterance because since he is explicating the implicature, there is no need to mention it. The fifth strategy is to interpret the semantic meaning content and explicate part of the meaning generated by the implicature, that is, to preserve utterance's ambiguity and provide clues to its interpretation.

A: Did you and C travel back to your house together?

B: My car wasn't working.

The interpreter: My car wasn't working, so I couldn't give him a ride.

B's response flouts the relation and quantity maxims by being irrelevant and provides less information than the required. The interpreter made the connection between the question and the answer more explicit, and thus the implicature becomes more easily available. The sixth strategy is **to interpret part of the semantic content and explicate part of the meaning generated by the implicature**. Interpreters resort to this strategy when omitting part of the semantic content makes the explicating of implicature more easily available.

A: Did you and C travel back to your house together?

B: My car wasn't working, and I had to take it in for repairs.

The interpreter: My car wasn't working, so I couldn't give him a ride.

B's response flouts the maxims of relation and quantity. The interpreter omitted the second part of B's response due to the fact that it merely elaborates on the information in the first part. The interpreter added "so I couldn't give him a ride" to make the implicit connection more explicit. The seventh strategy is **to explicate implicature only**. Such strategy ends the utterance ambiguity, but makes the semantic content redundant. For example:

A: How do you get on at work?

B: I'm getting a raise next month.

The interpreter: I'm getting on very well.

B's response flouts the maxim of quantity by giving less information than required. The interpreter explicated the implicature without including any of the semantic content. Finally, the eighth strategy includes the explication of only one implicature. The strategy is used if there is more than one implicature communicated in the message. For example:

A: Do you know why C put on his coat?

B: He was going out.

The interpreter: I don't want to be more specific.



I don't want to answer a silly question like that.

B's response flouts the maxim of relation, since it fails to address A's goal, and flouts the Quantity maxim, since it provides less information than is required. Two implicatures can be generated from B's response: the first is that B prefers not to be more specific. The second is that B considers the question rather than silly, because its answer is obvious. The interpreter explicates the first implicature to be the correct interpretation.

Jacobsen observed that interpreters have applied three strategies, the third, fifth and sixth. All of the used strategies involved the explication of an implicature or part of it. The third and fifth strategies left the semantic meaning for explicating all or part of the generated meaning. Jacobsen considered the first, third and fifth strategies as the only plausible strategies (as cited in Gerzymisch-Arbogast 2003:150-156).

Although consecutive interpreting shares some properties with SI, the processes have some fundamental differences. Consecutive interpreting shares the source text's oral nature, but unlike SI, it enjoys more available time borders. It is obvious that none of the mentioned strategies is applicable for SI situations; time limitations and the immediate nature of SI give SI interpreter no chance to choose the most adequate strategy among the abovementioned. Simultaneous interpreters' task would not be complete without regarding the characteristics of the SI process as an immediate oral process. The consecutive interpreting strategies that Jacobsen suggested cannot be applied to a simultaneously interpreted

discourse due to the difference in their cores. Simultaneous interpreters need to choose a strategy/model that can honor the missing elements in consecutive interpreting.

Abuarrah (2016) discusses the SI of implicature within political discourse. What made this research special is Abuarrah's consideration of another categorization for implicature. Abuarrah's research is based on Levinson's (1995,2000) categorization of implicature; his examples were retrieved from political conferences and discussed from a linguistic point of view. He's concluded that the misinterpretation of an implicature changes the implicature's meaning, and, as a result, part or even the whole message content will vary. In his regard of Levinson's heuristics (Q, I and M), Abuarrah (2016:21) states that "the shifts between strong and weak forms ends with a completely or partially different implicature". The misinterpreting that results from faulty use of strong and weak forms changes the original message's implicature. In his regard of I- heuristic, Abuarrah (2016:21) suggests that examples which are less consistent with I-heuristic implicate different meaning from what is intended. In addition, Abuarrah (2016:21) states that "the interpreter should be sensitive to any extra regularity in the message form as this implicates a level of markedness and therefore meaning unconventionality". That is, any deficiency in the interpreter's linguistic knowledge, the pragmatic knowledge on implicature particularly, distorts the original intended meaning in SI process.

In the next chapter, the study is digested to provide a theoretical background on the origins of SI and implicature, and to identify the main challenges that face simultaneous interpreters.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Theoretical Background**

#### **3.1 Introducing SI**

#### **3.2 Simultaneous Interpreters' Challenges**

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## **Chapter Three**

### **Theoretical Background**

#### **3.1 Introducing SI:**

Interpreting is a complex process that includes linguistic, social, cognitive and cultural aspects. The interpreter, as the only source of information, has the potential to impact the audience through the decisions he takes (Valero-Garcés and Martin, 2008:51).

The definition of interpreting suggested by Garcés and Martin elucidates the complexity of interpreting. Successful interpretation depends on including and respecting the different aspects involved in the process. Interpreting is linguistic since it mainly deals with languages. In addition, interpreting is social since the parties involved in the interpretive process do not share the same social norms; they belong to different social classes. The cognitive aspect of interpreting lies in the process itself; that is, it is concerned with the way that human mind functions while interpreting, (by interpreters and audiences). Interpreting is a cultural bridging process; in other words, it constitutes a connective process by which the interpreter communicates the source text's cultural norms.

According to Payas and Garbarini (2012), although interpreters had great contributions in facilitating communication, they have often been mistrusted, dislocated and even killed because of the risks that interpreters may pose on the client. Interpreters may favor the enemy, as a result, the

interpreters' words, intentionally or unintentionally, may become a fatal weapon that can seriously impact one of the battle parties. In 1914, an interpreter caused the death of several German officers when he misinterpreted the location of meeting with Portuguese officers in Angola (as cited in Lacorte:2014).

According to Lacorte (2014:315) “conference interpretation arose during WWI to facilitate communication with British and American negotiators who did not speak French”. Lacorte (2014) is concerned with consecutive interpreting only. Consecutive interpreting golden era was between WWI and WWII. Both of SI and consecutive interpreting are considered together and explained in reference to each other. Yet, there is a great difference between the two concepts. In one hand, consecutive interpreting is an interpretive act where the interpreter hears the message, takes notes, and renders the original message in target language as he/she is reading the notes. On the other hand, SI interpreters hear the message and deliver it instantly into the target language. The training that a consecutive interpreter receives is focused over note-taking. Consecutive interpreting is time consuming due to the fact that it requires a lot of pausing to give the interpreter a chance to transfer his/her notes into the target language.

In the 1920s SI saw light for the first time. The American businessman Edward Filene and the engineer A. Gordon Finlay developed the first so called telephonic interpreting equipment. The new equipment came as a replacement of consecutive interpreting in order to solve time

consuming problem. Herbert (1952) distinguishes three kinds of SI. The first kind is whispering; interpreters were hearing and whispering the interpreted message for delegates who brought their own interpreters. The second kind is telephonic interpreting where interpreters listen to the original message through earphones and deliver their interpretation through microphones. The third kind is translation at sight. In the third kind, interpreters were given a text and read it in another language. Sight translation is a part of consecutive interpreting as consecutive interpreters' task was based upon reading the notes made and delivering them in target language (as cited in Jourdenais and Mikklson:2015).

In 1945, Nuremberg postwar trials constituted the breakthrough point for SI. The trials were held following the end of WWII in order to judge whoever committed war crimes. The Nuremberg trials were recognized as not being possible without SI; that is, the interaction within the trials, between the judge who uses English, French or Russian languages and the accused who speaks German, obligatory required SI. After the success of SI in Nuremberg postwar trials, Colonel Doster (1904-1971) was invited to test SI system in UN headquarters. The success of the experiment led to the adoption of SI as the regular interpretation mode at the UN (Jourdenais and Mikklson: 2015:22).

Between 1930s and 1950s, first modern interpreting schools were established in politically strategic cities like Moscow, Manheim, Geneva, Vienna, and Washington DC. Since 1950s, interpreting worldwide

recognition was enhanced by the emergence of a number of professional associations like, International Association of Conference Interpreting (AIIC) in 1953. (Jourdenais and Mikklson: 2015:80).

### **3.2 Simultaneous Interpreters' Challenges:**

#### **3.2.1 introduction**

In her illustration of SI, the psychologist Anderson (1979) stated that:

Simultaneous interpretation is both cognitive and linguistic interest: cognitive because of the information processing involved in the task as well as the interpreter's apparent ease in juggling several concurrent operations; and linguistic, because of the type of information processing he does, the recoding of a message heard in one language into speech in another language. (p.1)

The fact that SI is both a cognitive and linguistic process is challenging for interpreters as the number of variables that affect the SI process are numerous. According to Ziobro-Strzpek (n.d:8):

Variables that exert strong influence on the interpreting output are numerous. They include the source language, the target language, the spontaneous, semi-spontaneous, or prepared nature of the speech, delivery speed, the speaker's intonation, the speaker's accent, the logic of the speech, information density of the speech, syntactic structures in the



speech, including the length of sentences and the number of embedded structures, the quality of the sound reaching the interpreter, the interpreter's knowledge of the subject matter, experience, training, mental and physical state, motivation, visibility of the speaker from the booth, the number of delegates who listen to the interpreting, the interpreter's relations with other colleagues in the team, etc.

One aim of this thesis is to outline the challenges that SI interpreters face. Therefore, I will consider three of the most critical challenges that can form the majority of the variables mentioned above.

### **3.2.2 Anticipation:**

According to Setton (1999:52) “anticipation has been described in SI researches as a strategy typically used for encountering verb-last or head-noun-last structure”. Authors like Lederer (1981), Gile (1995), Setton (1999) distinguish two kinds of anticipation: The first kind is ‘linguistic’ or ‘syntactic’ anticipation, which is based on the prediction of source discourse continuations from a knowledge of either collocations and formulas, predictor words like function words, connectives and subordinators, selectional categories and case morphology (Setton:1999: 52). The linguistic or syntactic kind is related to the interpreters’ linguistic abilities; in other words, it is related to the interpreters’ linguistic competence.

The second kind is ‘extralinguistic’ anticipation, which is based on external knowledge or ‘cognitive complements’. External knowledge varies according to the situation itself. The extralinguistic type is a very loose one. In other words, the concept of external knowledge includes all aspects of SI process which are beyond linguistics. Cognitive complements, whether verbal situation, contextual situation or background knowledge are related to the interpreters’ abilities. The interpreters’ ability to analyze and infer is the determiner of the interpreters’ success. (for more on cognitive complements, see 4.2)

### **3.2.3 Time Pressure:**

Study of SI may not be done without regarding the time and temporal aspect of SI. Interpreters need to work on time constraints and speech delivery speed as losing control over time affects SI process or even contribute to its failure. The first difficulty, considering time, is related to the production rate. Gumul and Lyda (2007:2) states that “As observed by Kirchhoff (1976), the presentation rate, over which the interpreter has no control, has an evident impact on all operations of the SI process”.

The production of source text is related to the speaker who may not consider the interpreters’ ability to follow and interpret simultaneously. In such case, the interpreter may be forced to omit some of the source message in order to keep up with the rest of the message and not losing control over the whole discourse.

The second aspect of time restrictions is the SI process itself. Time restricts the task of interpreting as interpreters need to listen and speak at the same time. Although the SI process depends on the input in the first place, the immediacy of the process constitutes a challenge for the interpreters.

Gumul and Lyda (2007:8-13) discussed coping with time pressure in SI. The first strategy for time coping is to keep minimum time lag between source message reception and target message delivery. Interpreters may attain better comprehension if they keep a short period of time between input reception and output production, but that strains short memory. The second way to cope with time is to adhere to the economy of expressions, which was suggested by Jones (1998). Moreover, Jones (1998) suggested avoiding repetition and choosing short forms to overcome time pressure. The third and final strategy is by Barik (1994) who suggested omission as a strategy for time pressure coping. According to Gumul and Lyda (2007:2) “The most visible outcome of the increased presentation rate is an accompanying increase in simultaneous interpreters’ omissions reported by Gerver (1969) as early as in 1969”.

### **3.2.4 Stress:**

SI can be marked as stress provoking due to the multi functions that SI interpreters need to carry in order to convey the source message. SI includes listening to source discourse, analyzing the message content (whether explicit or implied) and providing an accurate oral rendition of the

source message in the target language. Such complexity of tasks requires a great attention from the interpreters' side.

Researchers like Klonowicz (1994), Cooper et al (1982), Riccardi et al (1998), Kurz (2003), Jimaneze and Calatayud (2001) and Kao and Craigle (2013) examines stress from different perspectives. Fearing public speaking and speaker's speed of delivery were considered as the main stress generators to look into. Researchers conducted many studies in order to identify the sources of stress in interpreting. For example, Cooper et al (1982) used empirical study in which 826 surveys were distributed among interpreters considering stress.

Cooper's 14 page questionnaire considered issues like job satisfaction, sources of stress and mental health status. The study showed that 607 respondents reported high levels of work-related fatigue, exhaustion and mental stress, associated with poor conditions and source speech stress factors. However, 40-60% feeling that work-related stress causes a drop in performance quality was not confirmed by an assessment of interpreting samples for meaning correspondence and linguistic correctness (Pöchhacker:2016:n.p). As one of the most serious challenges, stress can affect the interpreting process seriously, or even make the whole process fail.

In all of the three challenges, implicature interpreting in SI was not considered as an independent case study. The challenges considered the source text as a whole without regard to implicated meanings as an extra

challenge. The following section therefore will explain implicature and how it can pose an extra challenge for interpreters.

### **3.3 Implicature:**

Grice (1975) distinguished two kinds of implicature, namely, conventional implicature and conversational implicature. Conventional implicature, according to Huang (2017:54) is “a non-truth conditional reference which is non-deductive in any general, natural way from the saying of what is said, but arises solely because of the conventional features attached to particular lexical items and/or linguistic constructions”. Conventional implicatures are attached to certain lexical items or linguistic constructions, which signs conventional implicature to the semantic, rather than pragmatic, field.

As a pragmatic phenomenon, conversational implicature captured the attention of many scholars like Grice (1975,1989), Horn (2004), Levinson (1983, 2000), Sperber and Wilson (1986) and others. In this research, focus will be centered on conversational implicature..

Grice (1975) established the cooperative principle, which states “Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice :1975:45). By the cooperative principle, Grice provides a description of the way people should act in a conversation, that

is to act according to the cooperative principle as an ideal description of conversational interaction.

According to Grice (1975:45-46), the cooperative principle stands upon four maxims, the Gricean maxims, which constitute the rules for obeying the cooperative principle.

**1- Maxims of Quantity:**

1. "Make your contribution as informative as required."
2. "Don't make your contribution more informative than is required."

**2- Maxims of Quality:** Be truthful.

1. "Don't say what you believe to be false."
2. "Don't say what you lack adequate evidence for."

**3- Maxim of Relation:**

"Be relevant."

**4- Maxims of Manner:** "Be perspicuous."

1. "Avoid obscurity of expression."
2. "Avoid ambiguity."
3. "Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)."
4. "Be orderly."

Grice argues that speakers intend to be cooperative when they talk. In this case the addresser is **observing** the maxims in a fairly direct way; he may nevertheless rely on the addressee to make his inferences on the assumption that the addresser is following the maxims of conversation (Levinson, 1983:104).

Observing maxims constitutes the ideal condition of a conversation. According to Marmaridou (2000:229) “by observing these maxims, interlocutors converse in a maximally efficient, rational and cooperative way. They speak, and they assume their addressees to speak, sincerely, relevantly and clearly, while providing sufficient information”. when the parties engaged in a conversation obey the maxims, the message content preserves its fluency engendering a conversation that lacks implicated messages.

A speaker in talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in several ways. The first one is when the speaker **violates** a maxim; for example, a speaker violates Quality maxim by telling a deliberate lie. The second way is to **opt out** a maxim and as a consequence of the whole cooperative principle by using certain hedges like “As far as I know” to opt out Quality maxim. The third way is to **flout** a maxim, that is, the speaker intends to achieve a particular communicative effect by adhering to the cooperative principle in indirect way.

According to Marmaridou (2000:234) “Grice observed that conversational implicature arising in the observance or flouting of the

maxims and in terms of the CP are actually generated in a particular context of use". Conversational implicature can be derived by flouting a maxim. Although flouting a maxim means the abandonment of the cooperative principle, such abandonment creates a conversational implicature due to the belief that there is a deeper cooperative principle at some deeper level. Such flouting is employed to convey an extra message as the producer trusts the recipient's ability in computing the implicated message.

Grice (1975:3) defines conversational implicature as "a set of non-logical inferences which contain conveyed messages which are meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense". What Grice attempts to say is that there are some kind of message underlying the actual utterance. Grice asserted the underdeterminacy principle which assumes that the linguistically encoded meaning radically underdetermines the proposition that the speaker expresses while uttering a sentence. However, Grice's definition of implicature was criticized. According to Horn (2004) "implicatures are distinct from the non-logical inferences the hearer draws; it is a category mistake to attribute implicatures either to hearers or to sentences" (p.3). In a contradictory manner, Grice (1989) himself, criticized maxims for not being coordinate:

The maxims do not seem to be coordinate. The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than



mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a number of recipes for producing contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference between something's being, and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of contribution at all. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information (Grice:1989:371).

Horn (2004) suggested two principles that can include and replace all of the Gricean maxims. The first is Quantity principle where there are a strong form and a weaker form. Strong and weak forms are determined by the entailment principle; that is, strong form entails the weak one, as in “all-some”, but not the opposite. In this case, implicature is derived from the actual choice of forms within discourse. In other words, using a certain form whether strong or weak implicates a deeper meaning that the producer wants to convey. In addition, Hirschberg (1991) adds that any set of ordered entities could create a quantity implicature. Horn (2004) stated that “The Q principle is a lower-bounding hearer-based guarantee of the sufficiency of informative content (“Say as much as you can, modulo Quality and R”); it collects the first Quantity maxim along with the first two “clarity” sub maxims of manner” (p.13).

The second principle by Horn is the Relation principle, R-principle. It is an upper bounding pragmatic principle which invites a lower bounding conversational implicature; that is, it assumes that there is no need to make a stronger, more complicated implicatures if the information already contributed by the statement is directly represented. R-principle includes

the second quantity sub maxim, the relation maxim, the third and fourth manner sub maxims. The difference between R and Q principles is that R principle, in contrary to Q principle, tends to minimize the linguistic form. Horn (2004) defined conversational implicature as “a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is **meant** in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is **said**. What a speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer than what she directly expresses” (p. 3).

Levinson (1983, 2000) took another path in discussing the utterance meaning. The default or presumptive meaning, which assumes preferred interpretations, arises from the structure of an utterance rather than its contextual use. Levinson (1987a,1991) criticized Horn’s distinction of implicature for his failure to distinguish between semantic minimization, which is defined as the fact that semantically general expressions are preferred over semantically specific ones, and expression minimization (minimization in form) according to which shorter expressions are preferred to longer ones (Levinson:1998:556).

In Levinson’s consideration of implicature, he criticized the Gricean theory of implicature. Levinson’s first criticism was for Grice’s consideration of generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) and particularized conversational implicatures(PCIs). While Grice considered (GCIs) as implicatures which require no specific contextual conditions, (PCIs) requires such conditions. Levinson (2000:16) added the next

clarification of Grice's point on (PCI) as “an implicature I from utterance U are particularized iff U implicates I by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not variably or even normally obtain”, and (GCI) as “an implicature I is generalized if U implicates I unless there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it”.

According to Carston (2004:182), Levinson distinguished between generalized and particularized conversational implicatures as “PCIs depend on some (unspecified) maxim of relevance which is responsive to particular contextual assumptions, while GCIs are underpinned by three informativeness principles (based roughly on Grice's quantity and manner maxims)”. From this point, Levinson introduced his three corresponding heuristics, namely the Q, I, and M heuristics. According to (Levinson: 2000: 33-38), the next three heuristics are the base for utterance interpretation:

- The Q-Heuristic: what isn't said, isn't. For example, (some !not all”).
- The I-Heuristic: what is expressed simply is stereotypically true. For example, (If you mow the lawn, I'll give you \$5.If you don't mow the lawn, I won't give you \$5).
- The M-Heuristic: what's said in an abnormal way isn't normal. For example (The corners of Sue's lips turned slightly upward. Sue didn't exactly smile).

In this research, Levinson's (1983, 2000) categorization of implicature will be considered as a reference to depend on. That is, what Levinson has provided by evidence, seems to be the most convincing discussion among other discussions raised earlier. Levinson's heuristics are explained further by principles that are based on and correspond to the heuristics. Q-principle corresponds to Q heuristic, I-principle corresponds to I heuristic and M-principle corresponds to M heuristic.

### **3.4 Levinson's categorization of Implicature:**

Each of Levinson's principles has two sides: a speaker's maxim, which specifies the speaker's role, and a recipient's corollary, which enjoins what is allowed for the addressee to infer.

#### **3.4.1 Q-principle:**

Q-principle by Levinson is related to Grice's first submaxim of Quantity and Horn's Q-principle. The principle stands upon the notion of "contrast set", a contrast of utterances that the speaker could have made. Moreover, Q-principle can be applied to unordered sets like (yellow +> not red).

Speaker maxim:

- Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-principle.

Hearer's corollary:

- Assume that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with their knowledge.

In the speaker's maxim, the speaker is not allowed to say less than is required, bearing in mind I[nformativness]-principle; that is, the speaker should provide sufficient information, but without violating the rule of information minimization that I-principle assumes. Information minimization declares the speaker's role in producing the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve the communicative function. Q-principle has three types, namely: Q- scalar, Q-clausal and Q-alternate.

### **3.4.1.1 Q-Scalar Implicature:**

According to Levinson (1983:133), Q-scalar implicature “consists of a set of linguistic alternates, or contrastive expressions of the same grammatical category, which can be arranged in a linear order by degree of informativeness or semantic strength”. Q-scalar implicature is derived from Horn-scale. That is, semantically strong form entails semantically weak form if the strong and weak forms are equally lexicalized, at the same word class and from the same register and from the same semantic relation or semantic field.

Considering examples like (all- some/ hot – warm/ excellent – good), the strong forms of (all, hot, excellent) entail the weaker forms of (some, warm, good). In other words, when “all the boys are playing”, then some,

the weaker form, of them are, but not vice versa. Yet, if “some of the kids are playing”, the strong form, all, will not be entailed; that is, the utterance implicates that  $\rightarrow$  not all of the kids are playing. Moreover, when “the food is hot”, the strong form “hot” entails the weaker form “warm”, but not the other way.

### 3.4.1.2 Q-Clausal Implicature:

Clausal implicature is derived from the usage of certain linguistic expressions that can be discriminated by their weakness or strength. According to Huang (2017:42) “Q- clausal implicatures also rest on a set of contrastive semantic alternates”. As Q- scalar, Q- clausal implicatures is established on a hierarchy of strength between semantic alternates, however, it is different in its constructional nature. According to (Levinson:2000:76) “the scalar implicatures are induced from ranked sets of alternates,... whereas the clausal ones derive from contrasts between one expression that entails its embedded sentence(s) and another one that does not”. Linguistic expressions like “believe- know/ or- and /possibly- necessarily” are instances of clausal implicature. For example:

“believe- know”

- Mary **believes** that Nigel has visited Kafka’s house on Golden Lane in Prague.

$\rightarrow$  Nigel may have visited Kafka’s house on Golden Lane in Prague, or may not.

“know” entails its constituent sentence (s), but “believe” does not.

### 3.4.1.3 Q-alternate Implicature:

In this subcategory, “quantity alternate” implicature has two subtypes. In the first subtype “Q- ordered alternate” the lexical expressions in a set are informationally ranked. For example: <succeed, try>

In 1888, van Gogh tried to set up an artist’s studio at Arles.

+> In 1888, van Gogh did not succeed to set up an artist’s studio at Arles.

The semantically stronger form “Succeed” does not entail “try”. “Succeed” and “try” are from the same contrast set, but the set is non-entailing. (Huang, 2014:53)

The second type is Q- unordered alternate where lexical expressions are of equal semantic strength. For example:

(white, red, blue, green, yellow)

- “The flag is blue.”

+> the flag is not, for example, red, green or white, or

+> the flag is not blue and red, or

+> the flag is only/all blue

(Huang,2014:53)

### 3.4.2 I-principle (I for Informative):

The I-heuristic is related to Atlas & Levinson's 1981 Principle of Informativeness, and is related to Grice's second submaxim of Quantity and Horn's R-principle.

Speaker's Maxim: The Maxim of Minimization

- 'Say as little as necessary', i.e. produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing the Q-principle in mind).

Recipient's Corollary: The Enrichment Rule.

- Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's M-intended point, unless the speaker has broken the maxim of Minimization by using a marked or prolix expression, specifically:
  - 1- Assume the richest, temporal, causal and referential connections between described situations or events, consistent with what is taken for granted.
  - 2- Assume the stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless this is inconsistent with 1.



- 3- Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential parsimony); specifically, prefer coreferential readings of reduced NPs (pronouns or zeros).
- 4- Assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is about if that is consistent with what is taken for granted.

(Levinson, 2000:114-115).

Levinson (1983) discussed the informative principle as the stereotypical interpretation of an implicature. I- implicature identifies the speaker's role as to minimize, that is, to produce the minimal linguistic information that is acquired for sufficient communication. On the other hand, the receiver's role is in the enrichment of the content and find the most adequate interpretation in a stereotypical manner. The main issue in I- implicature is that the speaker need not say more and the receiver should be stereotypical in interpreting the implied meaning. According to I-principle, informationally weak expressions tend to be enriched informationally by the hearer. According to Huang (2014:58) "The implicature engendered by I-principle is one that accords best with the most stereotypical and explanatory expectation given our knowledge about the world." For example:

- "John pressed the spring and the drawer opened."

The utterance implicates that:

+> John pressed the spring and then the drawer opened

+> John pressed the spring and thereby caused the drawer to open

+> John pressed the spring and in order to make the drawer open

### **3.4.3 M- principle:**

It is important to note that the M-principle operates in terms of alternates that contrast in form and not in semantic content (Huang:2014:62). M- implicature, is the stating of abnormal, marked expressions in order to indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation. By stating such marked expressions, the receiver role emerges in identifying the marked expressions and identifying the marked situation. In other words, the usage of certain marked linguistic forms is to indicate some other meaning than the normal, unmarked meaning.

Speaker's Maxim:

- Indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.

Recipient's Corollary:

- What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations.

In his consideration of M-implicature, Huang (2017:64) mentioned a number of dimension of contrast that M-implicature may involve:

This M-implicature opposition set may involve different dimensions of contrast in different context. Some dimensions are those on which the contrast is between prototype versus non-prototype, a ‘value-added’/ intensifying versus a ‘non-value-added’/ non-intensifying use or a literal use versus a metaphorical meaning.....other dimensions of contrast may involve resolving reference(as in the case of the use of proper names), disambiguating expressions (as in the case of hyponymy), and narrowing generalities (as in the case of pragmatic looseness versus strictness)

In her consideration of Levinson’s heuristics, Birner (2012:n.p) stated that:

Q- heuristic appeals to a contrast set of semantically distinct expressions (i.e., expressions that “say different things”), whereas his M – heuristic assumes a contrast set of formally distinct expressions that are semantically similar (i.e., they say nearly the same thing, but in different terms)

The M and I principles are in opposition; while I-principle implies a default and stereotypical interpretation, M-principle is employed to point out an unusual or unexpected situation by using marked or prolix expressions. The hearer would be guided towards the intended

interpretation by using marked expressions by the speaker. Levinson (2000:160) provided the next example on I and M implicatures:

- “Cortes killed Montezuma.”

I-implicature +> Cortes directly caused the death of Montezuma, e.g., strangled him with his own hands.

- “Cortes caused the death of Montezuma.”

M-implicature +> Cortes indirectly caused the death of Montezuma, e.g., ordered him to be put to death.

### **3.5 The Interaction Between Q-, I-, and M-principles:**

The reason that stands behind choosing this topic is the potential of conflict between the three implicatures. That is, in the case of conflict between the implicatures, which one should take precedence? Levinson (1991, 2000) provided an ordered set of precedence in order to resolve the potential conflict between the implicatures. Levinson’s resolution schema for implicature interaction suggests the precedence of Q-implicature over the I- and M-implicatures. For example:

- If bill Gates gave you a car for Christmas, it may have been a real one.

The example has two possible implicatures. The first is I-implicature:

+> the car was a toy car.

However, the utterance has a Q-clausal implicature, the conditional if:

+> the car may or may not have been a real car.

Following Levinson's schema, the Q-implicature precedes the I-implicature:

$Q > I$

+>possibly the car was a real car.

Moreover, Q-implicature precedes M-implicature. For example:

- It is not unlikely that Oxford will win the next boat race, and indeed I think it likely.

Q- implicature +> it is possible that it is likely that Oxford will win the next boat race.

M-implicature +> it is less than fully likely that Oxford will win the next boat race.

$Q > M$

+> it is likely that Oxford will win the next boat race.

Following Levinson's Schema, M-implicature precedes I-implicature. For example:

- The corners of Mary's lips turned slightly upward.

M-implicature +> Mary didn't exactly smile, she sort of smirked.

I-implicature +> Mary smiled in the normal way by producing a nice, happy expression.

$M > I$

+> Mary didn't exactly smile, she sort of smirked.

(Huang, 2017:51-53)

## **Chapter Four**

### **Elements to Consider in SI of Implicature**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

#### **4.2 Psycholinguistic Models of SI**

#### **4.3 SI as a Communicative Process**

## **Chapter Four**

### **Elements to Consider in SI of Implicature**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Under this topic, the research will try to identify the factors/elements which interpreters should consider in the SI process of implicature. The elements will assist interpreters in capturing implicated meanings considering the fact that implicatures are meant rather than said. Such elements are helpful in two ways: The first way is related to the understanding and capturing of implicatures. The factors constitute a reference for the interpreter when he/she is dealing with implicated meanings. The second way is related to the analysis of the retrieved examples. That is, identifying the related factors/elements help locate the source of the interpreter's failure. The determination of related elements requires a review of previous models of interpreting. Such elements will be discussed in light of implicature interpreting. The chosen elements will be regarded according to its contribution to implicatures interpreting in SI process.

#### **4.2 Psycholinguistic models for SI interpreting**

Since the SI process is both a linguistic and a cognitive process, the research will consider three psycholinguistic models to look for an illustration for implicatures interpreting in SI process.



In his consideration of psycholinguistics role in SI, Gerver (1975:119) stated that:

In spite of the fact that the simultaneous interpreter's skills would appear fertile ground for psychologists interested in, say, the study of **memory**, **attention**, **bilingualism**, or the analysis and development of **skilled behavior**, surprisingly little research has been carried out in this area by psychologists \_\_ and none at all on the selection and training of interpreters.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the psychologists' interest in forming a model that can illustrate SI process began. The psychologists' interest was in the study of interpretation as a behavior rather than studying the interpretive process as an outcome "output". Psychologists' focus was on the study of how interpreters' mind works during SI process. Gerver (1976), Moser (1978) and Levelt (1989,1993) are examples of models that have attracted the attention of psychologists to SI.

In Gerver's (1976) model, the concentration was on the illustration of how a piece of information is stored to get a continuous stream of input and output in SI process. The interpreter receives the source message and proceeds by interpreting it in accordance with what the source message contains, or interpreting it considering the match between what is produced and what exists within the source message and what memory can provide (Pöchhacker and Shlesinger,2002:150).

Gerver's model provided a great insight into the SI process. Human mind's memory and the way it deals with information is valuable. Yet, the model discusses the information that comes out of the source as oral signs that have a direct correspondence within the recipient's mind. The second model is by Barbara Moser (1978). Moser's model starts with acoustic input, oral speech, that is filtered in order to recognize syllables and words of the source language. Acoustic features are in the long term memory in addition to grammatical rules and semantic information. In other words, the sum of data related to both languages is stored within the long term memory. Long term memory occupied a great status within Moser's model as the home of SI process and all the elements related to interpretive process. Moser's model believes that the "verbal information triggers a search for a conceptual base" (as cited in Schwieter and Ferreira, 2017:453). Conceptual base is a prelinguistic meaning structure which activates target language elements (semantic, syntactic and phrase processing) in the way of output articulation" (Pöchlacker: 2004:101).

The third model is the Levelt model (1989, 1993). This model is the most accepted model among researchers. According to Schmid, and Lowie (2011: 270) "the crucial characteristic of the model is its modularity, which is required to account for the speed with which we speak (about two to five words per second)". According to Traxler (2011:1968), Levelt (1995) suggested that the speaker wishes to communicate ideas, such ideas are tied to lexical concepts. After lexical concepts are activated, lemmas related to

that lexical concept are activated. Lemmas provide information about the morphological properties of words. Next, phonemes are activated and organized in a sequence. In implicature, ideas have no lexical concepts to be tied to, the implicature core is the existence of ideas that are not expressed in a lexical manner. In such case, the activation of morphological and phonemes lead to the production of speech that does not include the deeper, unstated meaning of implicature. In his consideration of cognitive psychology, Levitin (2002:732) stated that:

since the truth of conversational implicature is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be true-what is said may be false), the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by ‘putting it that way’.

At this point, the previous three psycholinguistic models may, even partially, justify the production of normal talk. Yet, all of them could not justify the lack of talk which generates ideas. In other words, implicature is neither in the words of the speaker nor can be claimed by what is stated directly. In addition, the psycholinguistic models do not include the whole interpretive process; that is, how the interpreter’s mind works is a crucial issue to look into, but there are other elements that control the SI process, like the speaker himself, the audience, the non-linguistic factors within the interpreters’ minds and the socio-cultural factors (of the interpreters’ and audiences’).

So far, our aim is not satisfied; as a result, we are going to look in another place. Namely, the **Interpretive Theory**, by Danica Seleskovitch and Mariam Lederer, which was established in 1960s. Choi (2003) stated that “the interpretive theory is built upon four pillars: 1) command of native language, 2) command of source language, 3) command of relevant world and background knowledge, and 4) command of interpreting methodology.” (p.2)

The first and second pillars of the theory can be seen as the fundamental conditions of any linguistic communication between two parties who use two different languages. That is, they are general terms to be met even in less complicated processes as SI. The third pillar, command of relevant world and background knowledge is more critical for SI than any other communicative act. That’s to say, the oral nature of SI and the limited time require a precise, great base of background due to the lack of supportive materials during SI process. The fourth pillar, command of interpreting methodology, is different from other theories in a way that it combines meaning and cognition (Choi, 2003:2).

What makes the interpretive theory interesting for this research is its study of oral interpretation. That is, in Seleskovitch consideration of oral speech, the sound “talk” disappears, but sense remains, which is a shared characteristic with implicature as meaning beyond words.

According to Interpretive theory, interpreting falls into three stages. The first is to **understand sense**. In his discussion of sense Viaggio

(2006:22) stated that Parisian, Paris School scholars, have never provided a definition for sense; however, sense was taken as the propositional content of the message that needed to be interpreted.

In the first stage, sense could be taken as the content of the message. Understanding sense is somehow tricky; that is, the transfer of linguistic formulations into sense constitutes a variable according to the interpreter himself; two interpreters may come up with two senses. Interpreters' understanding is built upon his/her linguistic competence and knowledge of the world. The ability to understand the intended sense of the source text depends on his/her cognitive and linguistic competencies. According to Gile (2009:252) "interpreters and translators use their knowledge of language as well as extralinguistic knowledge to extract the meaning or 'sense' from source text". Interpretive theory is seen as a knowledge based process of making sense rather than operating on and between languages. In other words, Interpretive theory is built upon the interpreter's ability to understand the source message (Pöchhacker, 2004:68) .

The **second** stage is de-verbalization, where the original linguistic forms of the original discourse are forgotten, yet sense survives. The third and final stage is the reformulation of sense.

To enhance sense understanding, Interpretive theory distinguishes four kinds of **cognitive complements** for sense comprehension, namely, verbal, situational, cognitive contexts and knowledge of the world. Regarding verbal context, Lederer (1990:6) states that:

Speech is uttered in a continuous stream of words, each word contributing to the meaning of the words around it and being made more specific by these surrounding words. The meaningful interaction of words presents in the working memory (on average, 6 to 8 words) is the first instance of cognitive complements; it dispels word polysemy.

The stream of words provides great assessment to the interpreter's comprehension. The commitment to the verbal context assures tracing the flow of sense to be comprehended. However, the interplay between linguistics and cognition can be highly observed at this point; that is, the linguistic knowledge, whether semantic or syntactic, can affect the cognition of the interpreter and divert, or even do away with, the unit of meaning, which topples the whole process of sense comprehension.

The second complement, **situational context**, examines the interpretive process parties, the speaker, interpreter and audience. The interpreter's attitude in interpreting should be directed from the message producer, speaker, and point upon the audience's comprehension which is highly affected by their background. The failure in meeting situational context necessities manipulates the correctly interpreted message. Lederer (1990:6) stated that "Awareness of situational context represents a further cognitive complement that brings forth relevant meanings, and consequently dispelling polysemy. Being present at the discussions and witnessing the proceedings enables the interpreter to gather sufficient knowledge to translate appropriately".

The third complement, the cognitive context, which is the non-verbal memory of the interpreter, constitutes part of the interpreter's **mental ability**. Lederer (1990:7) defined cognitive context as “the cumulative knowledge brought by the speech chain up to the point where the interpreter is translating” Linguistic elements are vital, but it may not be shaped properly if cognitive context is not coherent with it.

The **fourth complement** is background knowledge, or encyclopedic knowledge. Lederer (1990:8) stated that “Knowledge of the world exists independently of acts of speech. It is the entirety of what we know, whether through experience or through learning” background knowledge's contribution to text understanding, including implicated meanings, is remarkable. It can be stated that any gap in the interpreters' background affects the understanding of the message, whether explicated or implicated, as a result, it affects implicated message conveyance.

In contrast to previous psycholinguistic models, Interpretive theory provides a clear definition of meaning unit. Meaning is not a creation of words or a certain length of a sentence, rather, unit of meaning is the product of emerging a sufficient number of words with what is stored in our cognition. Interpretive theory suggests that the interpreter should grasp each unit of meaning and render it according to his understanding. The theory is based on the linguistic and cognitive abilities of interpreters. The early mentioned complements present a review of the cognitive abilities of interpreters/translators. That is, all of the four complements depend on the

interpreter's/translator's cognitive skills like his/her memory, attention span, creativity and logical reasoning.

Bachman (1990) identified translational language competence as including two types of abilities: organizational and pragmatic competences in the SL and TL. Organizational competence consists of grammatical and textual competences. First of all, grammatical competence refers to language mastery; that is, language mastery is related to the translators' knowledge of syntax, lexis and semantic rules of SL and TL. The rules determine the sentence formation and meaning in both SL and TL (as cited in Cao, 2007: 42-43). Secondly, textual competence which includes the knowledge of the conventions that govern text formation. According to Adab & Schaffner (2000:8) translators can attain textual competence by being sensitized to textual features such as words, structures, patterns, text type and text genre. Textual domains, which are mastered by the translators as a result of their professional career, characterize the translators' competence profiles. Textual competence relies on the translator's ability to realize the cohesive and rhetorical rules for a text. That is, translators ability to mark the semantic relationships such as reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical cohesion (Cao,2007:43).

The second type, pragmatic competence, includes the illocutionary competence and sociolinguistic competence. According to Baker (2016:15) Bachman (1990) lists four language functions as part of illocutionary competence:



- 1- Ideational function: the way we convey meanings and experiences.
- 2- Manipulative function: using language in an instrumental way to achieve ends.
- 3- Heuristic function: the use of language to discover new things about our world and solving problems.
- 4- Imaginative function: using language beyond the 'here and now' (e.g for humor).

Illocutionary competence is related to the translators' pragmatic ability to perform these function appropriately.

Sociolinguistic competence refers to the translators' knowledge of the sociolinguistic conventions to perform language functions in a given context. That is, translators' sociolinguistic competence is related to the appropriateness of meaning and form with regard to two language and culture contexts (Cao,2007:43)

Baker (2016:15) adds that “ sociolinguistic competence is sensitivity to the context where language is used, ensuring that language is appropriate to the person or the situation”. Sensitivity may be to difference in local dialect, difference in register, speaking in a native-like or natural way, cultural variations, cultural references and figures of speech.

Ali. et al (2012) considers the stylistic and linguistic difficulties in translating Quran into English. Such difficulties are not limited to Quran translation, rather, they may face translators in any context:

- 1- Lexical problems: the difficulty in rendering some lexical items stands as the major difficulty for the translators. The absence of a direct corresponding equivalent compels the translators to convey the meaning in a communicative manner. Such conveyance would not communicate the full intended message as the employed item is not fully conveyed. Communicative manner is related to the translator's linguistic abilities and his/her background. The miscommunication of a meaning may cause the loss of the intended impact and/or create a rendition that carries other indications.
- 2- Syntactic problems: the variance in the syntactic systems of source language and target language troubles the translators. Tense is an obvious syntactic problem that encounter translators. That is, the variance of tense between English and Arabic creates a challenge for translators. Each tense carries certain indications that need to be conveyed. Yet, it is challenging for translators to convey the twelve tenses of English using the three tenses of Arabic.
- 3- Semantic problems: the semantic features of source and target text pose a difficulty for translators. Social attitudes and biological sex are examples of the problematic semantic features. Actually, the semantic features may carry implicated meanings; that is, the social attitude towards the use of "nurse" as specified to females. Such consideration conforms what Levinson calls "I-implicature", which assumes the stereotypical understanding by audience.

- 4- Metaphor : using words or phrases to describe something different from the usual use of the same words or phrases in order to make a more powerful description (Oxford Advanced Learner's dictionary, 2010:965). The metaphoric usage of language was assigned to M-implicatures. That is, the metaphor is an abnormal use of language that requires the interpreter to identify the abnormal situation it stands for.
- 5- Metonymy: according to Newmark (1988:125), metonymy occurs "when the name of an object is transferred to take the place of something else with what is associated". The transference occurs between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning of an object with an implicit clue to point the relation. Metonymies can be categorized under M-implicatures as it the use of metonymies is abnormal and carry implicated message.
- 6- Ellipsis: as the deletion of some parts of a sentence, ellipsis sands an instance of I-implicatures. That is, what the audience can understand stereotypically is omitted due to the conventionality of understanding what is omitted.
- 7- Polysemy: the variety of meanings and senses of the same word constitutes a challenge for translators/interpreters. The decisions that a translator should make about the most appropriate meaning of a polysemy should meet the source text's intended impact. The mistranslation of polysemies would divert the source text's meaning,

or create other indication related to the inappropriate translation of a polysemy.

If implicature is understood by the interpreter as a part of the comprehended sense, then implicature is transmitted into target language. Yet, if interpreters failed to comprehend the implicature, the message is counted as a transfer of linguistic forms, which Interpretive theory rejects. Viaggio (2006:22) comments that “the Parisians fail to make explicit that a translation may have a purpose different from those of the original” Interpretive theory, which is a creation of Parisian school, considers sense to be a representation of the interpreter’s knowledge of the world and meaning comprehension. The presentation of meaning as sense is interesting, yet it is not fully controlled.

To sum up, what Interpretive theory suggests is applicable to implicature interpreting in SI. The concept of “sense”, as Interpretive theory puts, is a comprehensive concept that can include implicature. As Interpretive theory do away with written form in the second stage, it supports the comprehension of the message as an idea rather than a linguistic form. Implicature shares such characteristic by having no written form and by its need to be conveyed without a linguistic form. In such case, Interpretive theory is able to provide a fair reasoning for implicature creation as a sense to be comprehended by linguistic forms. The sense of linguistic forms or the meaning unit that the interpreter reaches includes

implicature and later to reach a full comprehension of a message. Sense may be constituted by implicature(s) itself in other cases.

The suggested cognitive compliments cover great aspects and introduce rules for interpreters during SI process. Interpretive theory provides a logical discussion of how interpreting proceeds. Interpreter's background effect is taken as one of the main concepts to treat in Interpretive theory, regarding its role in determining the sense.

Criticism for Interpretive theory by linguists is about the way that Interpretive theory considers text as a second by second sequence rather than taking it as a whole. Such consideration of text, according to linguists, lead to the micro-level consideration of text, which is shown by the focus on cognitive task of SI process. The greatest success for Interpretive theory is in providing a clear explanation of meaning as "sense", but such success was interrupted by the fact that there is no specific way to capture sense itself. Since the interpretation of a text may differ from the original text's purpose, it is necessary to determine the **purpose** of the original text and keep it in mind during the interpretation process. Such trouble should be handled by examining other competencies that interpreters should consider in order to grasp the intended meaning and communicate the intended impact.

According to Snell-Hornby, Pöchhacker and Kaindl (1994:169):  
 "Danica Seleskovitch proposed her *théorie du sens* in explicit

contradistinction to theories of linguistic meaning, which then tended to show little concern for the actual use of language in communication”.

### **4.3 SI as a Communicative Process**

**Theory of Translation and Interpreting** (T&I henceforth) was found as an interesting theory to be considered. T&I, as a theory for product-oriented interpreting research, was laid down by skopos theory by Reiss and Vermeer (1984), which rejects the psycholinguistic regarding of SI. Skopos (purpose/function) is a theory by functionalists; it assumes that the text has a function or a purpose to be conveyed by no matter ways; that is, skopos theory is built upon the idea that the source text has a function or a purpose and that the translation of a text must be a reflection of such function.

Skopos theory constitutes the main element in T&I theory. Yet, skopos of what? Lakoff (1987) considered the skopos to be at the level of the conference assignment. Vermeer (1984) takes the skopos of the target text. That is, the intended function is the target text's. Most interesting opinion is by Pöchhacker (1995) who takes the source text skopos. Since our focus is on implicature which arise basically in source text, we will take Pöchhacker's (1995) point of view. Interpreters' duty is not limited to the delivery of words. That is, interpreters should convey the function of the words in order to communicate its intended impact for audience. such impact constitute part of the grammatical competence, pragmatic competence precisely.

One of the main concepts that linguists take as a starting point for their discussion is “text”. While Interpretive theory divides text by meaning unit and sense/s, T&I theory takes the text as one, holistic unit. Such unit is dealt with as a construct of a number of individual texts; in other words, it is a hypertext that foreground the links between the text’s constituents, as Pöchhacker (2004) calls. Hypertext should be dealt with as a determiner of T&I perspective of SI process. In other words, the hyper-text idea demonstrates the product oriented study of SI process. The assumption that full text being a hyper of texts can be useful in our discussion; that is, dealing with a single statement which contains implicature may not cover the whole process of implicature interpreting, but taking into account the general purpose of the whole text as part of the interpreters’ background and situational context of the text makes dealing with a single text possible.

T&I theory is developed upon the merge of functionalists’ “Skopos theory” (1984) and Holz-Mänttari’s (1984) “Theory of Translational Action”. SI in Holz -Mänttari’s (1984) comprehensive theory regard SI as a social interaction process, in which text has more than its linguistic parts. SI is treated as a communicative process which has much more than the linguistic forms conveyance.

Asserting Holz -Mänttari’s thoughts of SI as a social interaction process, Pöchhacker (1995:34) stated that:

The purpose to be fulfilled by translation and interpreting is largely constrained by the target-culture recipients. In

essence, the theory holds that the target text must first and foremost conform to the standard of *intratextual* coherence, i.e. it must “make sense” within its communicative **situation** and **culture**. Only in the second place must there be *intertextual* coherence, i.e. some relation of fidelity or loyalty (Nord 1991a) to the source text. In this functionalist conception the standard by which professional T&I is to be judged is not the degree of *equivalence* with the original but the extent to which the target text functions as intended within its socio-cultural context.

The socio-cultural aspect constitutes one of the main elements in SI process, it should be met as a criterion for the process success. In addition, the intratextual coherence importance should be taken as a primary standard to be satisfied. Applying such theory on implicature interpreting in SI, implicature is counted as one of elements to meet the intra and inter textual coherence. However, what makes the nature of such theory interesting is its justification of the process beyond the study of mind; it goes beyond and discusses the process in a socio-cultural view, which can constitute a reference for interpreters to meet during SI when it comes to implicature interpretation. SI process, according to Pöchhacker (1995:34), is defined as “a process of cultural transfer according to a set of hierarchical principles”. The cultural competence of an interpreter is a necessity for the success of message communication. Abad and Schiffner (2000:10) state that “though translators can said to be interculturally competent, they think and feel predominantly in terms of a particular, their



own culture”. However, translators need to be culture specialists in which they can mediate between the cultural elements of both languages.

The cultural awareness of an interpreter can include social conventions, cultural rituals and traditions and cultural variations like dances, festivals, and traditions. Regarding implicature interpreting, message conveyance constitutes a more challenging process. In other words, the odds of delivering an inappropriate message is higher due to the fact that dissolving the cultural bound or cultural specific items is a time consuming process.

Ray (2008:5) discusses cultural untranslatability as a phenomena that occurs when a situational feature relevant for the source text is absent from the culture of the target text. Idioms, sayings, proverbs, jokes and puns are examples of cultural untranslatability. Such cultural untranslatability instances constitute a hindrance for translators and interpreters due to the implicated meanings it may carry.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Data Analysis**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

#### **5.2 Data Analysis**

## **Chapter Five**

### **Data Analysis**

#### **5.1 Introduction:**

In this chapter, the analytical approach is adopted and the retrieved examples on implicature will be analyzed. The analysis is based on Levinson's categorization of implicature.

Levinson distinguished three main principles, Q[quantity], I[nformativness] and M[anner] principles. Q-principle deals with semantic contrast. In Q-principle, the speaker's knowledge of the world governs the speaker to make a statement that cannot be informationally weaker than his knowledge of the world allows. On the other hand, the hearer assumes that the speaker has produced the strongest statement that is consistent of what he knows (c.f. Abuarrah:2016:2). Three types of Q-principle can be identified: Q- scalar, Q-clausal and Q-alternate implicatures. The second principle is I-principle which identifies the speaker's role as to produce the minimal linguistic information that is acquired for sufficient communication. On the other hand, the receivers' role lies in the enrichment of the content and finding the most adequate interpretation in a stereotypical manner. The third principle M-principle, is the stating of abnormal, marked expressions in order to indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation. The usage of certain marked linguistic forms is to indicate some other meaning than the normal, unmarked meaning.

In the analytical process, Levinson's principles will constitute the base for identifying implicatures within the source text. Types of Implicatures will be decided according to Levinson's categorization. After identifying the implicature(s) of source text, the misinterpretations of the original text's implicatures will be discussed in light of the violation of Levinson's principles in order to identify the reasons that stand behind misinterpreting implicatures.

The skopos of the source text will be regarded as the starting point to identify the misinterpretation in the first place. The function of the source text will be identified before going through the interpretation in order to check the function of the interpretation later. Any failure in attaining the skopos of source text in the interpretation is a failure .

Examples on Q-implicatures and I-implicatures are going to be retrieved from the collected data of the Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu speech to a joint session of the US Congress on May 24, 2011 and the American former president Barak Obama in his final state of the union on January 12, 2016. All of examples' interpretation are retrieved from BBC news agency.

## 5.2 Data Analysis

### Q-implicatures:

#### Example (1):

Netanyahu: “I will accept a Jewish state.” Those six words **will change (1)** history. They’ll make it clear to the Palestinians that this conflict must come to an end; that they’re not building a Palestinian state to continue the conflict with Israel, but to end it. And those six words **will convince (2)** the people of Israel that they have a true partner for peace.”

The interpreter:

" نعم أنا مستعد لقبول دولة يهودية" هذه الكلمات الست **يمكن أن تغير** التاريخ انه تجعل الأمور أكثر وضوحا بالنسبة للفلسطينيين بان هذا الصراع ينبغي أن ينتهي ، إنهم لن يقوموا ببناء دولة فلسطينية لمواصلة الصراع مع إسرائيل ولكن لإنهائه هذه الكلمات الست **ضرورية** لان يفهم وان لديهم شريك صادق للسلام . “

Back translation: “yes I am ready for a Jewish state” those six words **may** change history, it makes things clearer to Palestinians that this conflict should end, they are not going to build a Palestinian state to continue the conflict with Israel, but to end it. Those six words are **necessary** to understand that they have a true partner of peace

Netanyahu intends to emphasize the role of the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, in changing the current state, the conflict, between Israelis and Palestinians through recognizing Israel as a Jewish state.

Netanyahu aims to communicate the idea that Palestinians hold the key for peace.

In the source text, Netanyahu used the strong form “will” twice in order to confirm the impact of recognizing a Jewish state on the political scene. The first use of “will” asserts that stating the six words “I will accept a Jewish state” is going to, for sure, change history. Netanyahu implicates that:

+> a change of history will occur, for sure, if a Jewish state is recognized by Palestinians.

The history change, that Netanyahu claims, will happen ( not may, might, should or must)

The interpreter’s interpretation “يمكن ان تغير التاريخ”, which means “may change history”, used the weak form “may” which does not express the same function that the strong form expresses. The strong form usage is to assert the speaker; Netanyahu believes in a coming historic change if a Jewish state was recognized by the Palestinians.

From another angle, how is the audience going to understand the interpretation? The usage of the weak form “يمكن”, may, produces additional implicature(s) that do not exist in the original text; the interpretation implicates that

+> a history change, by accepting a Jewish state, may happen, or may not happen

The interpreter failed to realize the effect of altering a stronger form with a weaker one on the message meaning. In other words, Netanyahu's intentions is in emphasizing the great effect of recognizing a Jewish state as making a history change. His intention was not satisfied due to use of a weaker form instead of the original, strong, form. That is, the history change for Netanyahu is inevitable, but it may or may not occur according to the interpreter. From another point of view, the interpreter's failure is in the choice of the right equivalence; that is, if the interpreter's interpreted 'will' correctly, the interpretation would be appropriate. The interpreter's deficiency lies in his linguistic competence, semantics precisely. Such deficiency led to a failure in the pragmatic effect of the interpretation.

The second use of "will", "will convince", was interpreted as "ضرورية لان يفهم", which means "necessary to understand". The original strong form "will" was omitted and replaced by a linguistic form that does not carry the same implications and/or impact.

While the original text implicates that:

+> accepting a Jewish state is the only condition to convince Israelis that there is a peace partner.

The interpretation implicates that:

+> accepting a Jewish state is among other conditions to convince Israelis that there is a peace partner.

The interpretation does not reflect the intended purpose of the speaker in asserting the great role of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. In other words, the interpretation could not fulfill Netanyahu's purpose of uttering the original utterance. As the first part of the example, the interpreter's failure generates from his/her incorrect choice of equivalence. The failure in rendering 'will' affects the original pragmatic function that it is employed for. In other words, 'will' carries certain implications that need to be conveyed, but the implications are lost due to the linguistic item 'will' misinterpretation.

### **Example (2):**

Obama: "It's a change that can broaden opportunity **or** widen inequality"<sup>1</sup>

The interpreter: "انه تغيير يوسع نطاق الفرق و يوسع أيضا نطاق اللامساواة"<sup>2</sup>

Back translation: it is a change that broadens opportunity and widens inequality.

The speaker, Obama, intends to establish a dichotomy between the effects of change. The implicature can be categorized as Q-clausal implicature; that is, it rests on a ranked set of alternates, "and/or" in this example. The original text implicates that:

<sup>1</sup> Obama's speech (original) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wul0fP4kc64>

<sup>2</sup> Obama's speech (interpreted) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqGbGM6KLNA&t=3012s>



- 1- +> Change can broaden opportunity, or perhaps not broaden opportunity
- 2- +>Change can widen inequality, or perhaps not widen inequality.

There is no way for both possibilities to be achieved at the same time. In other words, the two possibilities are running contrary to each other. In the interpreted discourse, the interpreter used the strong form “و” which means “and”. Such usage contradicts the use of “or” in the original discourse. In other words, the usage of “or” is to establish a dichotomy between two instances that cannot occur at the same time while the use of “و” , which means “and”, has an additive function that claims the two instances to occur at the same time. The use of “و” generates confusion for the audience, simply because it is illogical. The interpreter failed to communicate the purpose of the utterance. The original speaker, Obama, did not state what the interpreter is communicating for the audience. The message that the audience receives is diverted, illogical and cannot serve the aim that it was meant for. It can be stated that providing the stronger form of an expression would not serve the function that the weak form is used for. The interpreter’s misinterpreting rises mainly from his failure to convey the weak form ‘or’. The weak form can be interpreted directly as ‘أو’; such failure affected the pragmatic function of the source item and diverted it to the exact opposite. The interpreter’s deficiency lies in his textual competence, mainly, in his ability to produce a coherent text.

### Example (3):

Netanyahu: “But while we hope and work for the best, and while we work for the best we **must** also recognize that powerful forces oppose this future. They oppose modernity. They oppose democracy. They oppose peace.”

"وبينما نأمل ل أفضل وان نفعل.. وان نفعل كل ما بوسعنا من اجل أفضل مستقبل، إن هناك قوى شريرة تعارض المستقبل، تعارض المستقبل وتعارض الديمقراطية وتعارض السلام"

Back translation: and while we hope to a better and to do... to do all we can for the best future, **there are** evil forces oppose the future, oppose the future and oppose democracy and oppose peace.

The skopos of Netanyahu here is to emphasize his good intentions and, in contrast, to emphasize other forces' bad intentions towards peace, future and democracy.

The use of the strong form “must”, “ we **must** recognize other opposing forces”, cannot be rendered by other forms because the use of a strong form carries implications that another form cannot hold. The speaker's use of “must” indicates his intentions in attaining a certain effect on the audience; that is, the speaker is aiming towards asserting the importance of recognizing the “bad forces” by using the strongest form of the scale (must) and excluding other weaker forms from the scale, like (should, need to).

The interpretation has no corresponding form for the original strong form, that is, the interpretation omitted the whole strong form and replaced it with an affirmative statement. The form “إن هناك قوى شريرة”, which means “there are evil forces”, does not reflect the intended purpose of using a strong form; actually, “must” does not confirm, or confirms, the existence of evil forces. Omitting the implicature that carries the strong form reflects the interpreter’s lack of knowledge about the effect of implicature conveyance on the original message’s content. In other words, the interpretation does not carry the intended purpose of the speaker.

Netanyahu’s purpose in asserting his positive role and others’ negative role was distorted. That is, the interpretation has no clue on Netanyahu’s asserting the recognition of bad forces by the good forces, which he constitutes a part of. The interpreter omitted the strong form along with its impact or its pragmatic effect. The misinterpretation lies in the interpreter’s lack of appreciation for the implicated meanings that a certain item can hold.

### **I-implicatures:**

The I-heuristic stands upon the speaker’s minimization role and the role of enrichment by the audience. While the speaker produces the minimal linguistic information sufficient to communicate the intended message, the audience role lies in amplifying the linguistic information in order to attain the most specific interpretation that serves the speaker’s intended message.

The I-implicature contains a number of cases where the speaker minimizes the linguistic information and the audience/hearers amplify and enrich the linguistic information in order to reach the interpretation that serves the speaker's intentions. For example:

#### 1- Definite reference

Definite reference is related to the mutual background that the speaker and the hearer hold. The shared knowledge between the speech parties, the speaker and the interlocutor, on a certain subject creates a reference for addressees to understand the relations that beholds between the engaged elements. For example:

- It is a Song vase and on the base of the vessel are four Chinese characters.
- +> It is a Song vase and on the base of the **vase** four Chinese characters. (Huang, 2014:59)

The speaker and the hearer realize that the “vessel” is the “vase”, due to their mutual knowledge on the “Song vase”.

#### 2- Inference to stereotype

The inference to stereotype is built upon the presumptions that the interlocutors have about the world. In other words, the inference to stereotype is related to stereotypical presumptions that interlocutors use to

augment the intended message of the speaker (Levinson:2000:54). For example:

- Have you met the new nurse?

+> have you met the new female nurse?

The I-implicature lies in using “nurse” without specifying the gender of the nurse. The hearer’s presumptions direct the audience to define the gender of the nurse as a female.

I am going to sell my roses in the subway.

+> there are a lot of people in the subway

The inference to stereotype is related to audience’s background. That is, what the audience know will determine their enrichment of the minimized linguistic information.

The following examples are retrieved from the collected data on implicature interpreting in SI process.

### **Example (1):**

Netanyahu: “They could put a bomb anywhere. They could put it in a missile. **They're working on missiles that could reach this city (1).** They could put it on a -- **on a ship inside a container to reach every port (2).** **They could eventually put it in a suitcase or in a subway (3).**”

The interpreter:

"يمكنهم أن يطلقوا قنبلة وان يطلقوا صاروخا ربما تصل إلى □نا وربما يمكنهم في نهاية الأمر أن يضعوا قنبلة في حقيبة ما في □كان ما."

Back translation: they could launch a bomb and launch a missile, it may reach our cities and they may eventually put a bomb in a suitcase somewhere.

Netanyahu is addressing the American congress. He is talking about the expected dangers of nuclear-armed Iran. The aim of the speaker is to stress the anticipated results of Iranian possession of nuclear weapon.

Netanyahu provides three consequences of Iran's nuclear weapons:

- **"They're working on missiles that could reach this city", which implicates that:**

1- +> Iran's missiles threaten the USA .

Netanyahu's words are chosen wisely to detect the anticipated threats of Iran's weapons. In the first utterance, Netanyahu suggested the threat to "this city", which is Washington, to emphasize Iran's threat to the USA. The implicated meaning that Netanyahu intended can be captured stereotypically by the audience, that is, if Iran's missiles can reach ("this city", Washington), it will reach other American cities and threat the whole of the United States. The implicature in this utterance can be categorized under Levinson's I-principle, specifically a **definite reference**, since "this

city” is known to the audience. As a result, the interpreter should provide an interpretation that can deliver the same content and achieve the same effect of the original text. The interpreter’s interpretation is “يمكنهم ان يطلقوا ” “قنبلة وان يطلقوا صاروخا ربما تصل إلى □□نا”.

“مدننا” is back translated as “our cities”, but as the speaker is Netanyahu, “our cities” carries other implicated meaning than the existed ones in the original. The interpretation implicates that :

- 1- +> Iran’s missiles threaten Israel. Or
- 1- +> Iran’s missiles threaten both Israel and America

There is no way that the audience can come up with the same meaning of the original text through the provided interpretation. The interpreter failed to reflect Netanyahu intention (skopos) in asserting Iran’s threat on the USA. The interpreter’s failure occurred when he produced utterances different from the original's; as a result, new implicated meanings were, stereotypically, communicated. The interpreter’s failure can be regarded as a deficiency in the pragmatic aspect which is concerned with the actual use of language. In other words, the interpreter made a slight change in the original message form, but that change created a message that has other implications. the interpreter’s deficiency lies in the illocutionary competence in which he could not communicate the intended impact of the original text.

- **“They could put it on a -- on a ship inside a container to reach every port”, which implicates that:**

2- +> Iran’s bombs can easily be moved and can affect economy.

Netanyahu intended message in this utterance lies in the deep implicated meaning; that is, Netanyahu’s intentions are not explicated. Employing certain expressions leads to an effect in the audience mind. That is, using “port” triggers the economic threat that Iran’s weapons can pose. The rising of the I-implicature in the utterance is related to the use of the word “port”. That is, the inference to stereotype case of “port” triggers Iran’s danger on the economical side. In other words, the speaker’s attempt to communicate Iran’s threat on economy was built upon the assumptions that constitute the enrichment role of audience. The audience enrichment lies in the audience background of a “port” as an economical facility and the idea of having a bomb there would affect economy seriously.

The interpreter’s interpretation has no correspondence to this part of the original message. The interpreter’s omission, whether intended or not, affected the content of the original message, as a result, Netanyahu’s aim by uttering these words was not fulfilled.

- **“They could eventually put it in a suitcase (3) or in a subway (4)”, which implicates that:**

3- Iran’s bombs may not be detected



#### 4- Iran's bombs can cause a lot of deaths

Netanyahu precise choice of his words in order to expose Iran's threat originates in audience cognition. In other words, Netanyahu is triggering some effects by using certain expressions that trigger specific ideas in the hearers' minds. In this way, the triggered ideas become of the audience; that is, the ideas would be enriched by the audience in order to reach Netanyahu's aim of his words. The I-implicature can be assigned to **inference to stereotype** case since the used expressions are related to certain prototypical effects within the audience's minds; suitcase is a small, easily moved and easily hidden object that the idea of having a bomb inside is frightening; also "subway" is a crowded place that having a bomb there would cause a great number of casualties, which is also a terrifying idea. Netanyahu is choosing the words and leaving the rest to the imagination of the audience to enrich and, therefore, to feel the horror.

The interpretation states that “وربما يمكنهم في نهاية الأمر أن يضعوا قنبلة في”  
 ”حقيبة □ (3) في □ كان □ (4)

The interpreter succeeded in capturing and maintaining the same effect of the third implicature, which is “Iran's bombs may not be detected”. The difficulty in detecting Iran's bombs and the easiness of Iran's bombs move was successfully conveyed. The original text and the interpretation have the same implicated message that Netanyahu intends to communicate.

However, the fourth implicature, which is “Iran’s bombs can cause a lot of deaths” was not successfully interpreted. Netanyahu used a certain expression to point out a specific idea. In other words, he used “subway” to point out the deaths that Iran’s bombs can cause in a place that is full of people to create a terrifying image for Iran. Yet, the interpreter used “مكان ما” which means “somewhere” as a correspondence for “subway”, which is not true and cannot communicate the image that Netanyahu has created in the source text. From another point, the original text produces I-implicature that can be conventionally understood. The interpretation, however, cannot be understood naturally as the I-principle suggests. That is, “مكان ما”(somewhere), does not communicate a crowded place where a bomb could be terrifying. The interpreter violated the I-principle by minimizing without keeping in mind providing enough information to communicate the original text’s content. Interpreter’s failure can be assigned to the lack of illocutionary competence.

### Example (2):

Netanyahu: “Thank you all, and thank you President Obama, for your steadfast commitment to Israel’s security. **I know economic times are tough.** I deeply appreciate this.”

Interpretation:

"اشكركم نشكركم جميعا واشكركم سيدي الرئيس اوباما على دعمك المتواصل لامن اسرائيل على الرغم من الظروف الصعبة التي نواجهها نحن نقدر ذلك كثيرا "

Back translation: I thank you, we thank you all, and I thank you Mr. president Obama for your steadfast support to Israel's security. Despite the tough conditions which **we face**, we appreciate that a lot.

Netanyahu expresses his appreciation of the American role in protecting Israel's security. The American steadfast commitment which is accompanied by American tough economic times is what Netanyahu is praising.

Netanyahu did not explicate whose economic times he is referring to since that can be grasped stereotypically from the context. Such stereotypical comprehension by the audience side created I-implicature; the **definite reference** that Netanyahu used, produced the I-implicature.

"I know **economic times are tough, I deeply appreciate this** " implicates that:

+> Netanyahu knows that **American** economic times are tough, and he deeply appreciates the American steadfast support.

The definite reference lies in Netanyahu's deletion of "American" since it can be understood naturally from the context when the audiences enrich the minimized version of the utterance. That is, the mutual knowledge, on the American steadfast support, that Netanyahu and the audience share constitutes the base for the audience to amplify the minimized linguistic information. The interpreter diverts from the speaker's intention. The interpretation states that "على الرغم من الظروف الصعبة التي"

”تواجهها”, which is translated as “despite the tough condition **we** face”. The interpreter’s use of “we”, which can refer to both American and Israeli tough economy times, generates unintended implicatures. Possible Implicatures according to the interpretation are:

+> Netanyahu knows that the Israeli and American economic times are tough.

The generated implicature is illogical. In other words, the American role despite the tough economy times that America faces has no connection to Israeli economy. From another perspective, the interpreter’s words could be understood as if Netanyahu is referring to his own country by saying “تواجهها” (we face), which implicates:

+> Netanyahu knows that Israeli economy is facing tough times.

Again, that is not logical since Netanyahu’s aim is to praise the American role is preserving his country’s security.

The interpreter failed to capture the lexical narrowing that Netanyahu had made, as a result, the interpreter failed to capture the I-implicature in the utterance. The interpreter’s linguistic competence affected his understanding of the source text and caused the failure in the interpretation process. The interpreter’s realization of ellipsis caused the diversion of the source text intended message even though the ellipsis occurs for a stereotypically understood part of the sentence.

**Example (3):**

Netanyahu: “But Israel will not negotiate with a Palestinian government backed by the Palestinian version of al-Qaeda. That we will not do.”

The interpreter:

“اسرائيل لن تتفاوض مع حكومة تدعمها ... حكومة تؤيدها القاعدة”

Back translation: “Israel will not negotiate with a government supported by... backed by al-Qaeda”

The purpose of Netanyahu is to show the absolute refusal to deal with Islamic radicals, Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Netanyahu’s speech was in 2011 after three years from the first war on Gaza, Hamas’ home. Netanyahu’s words came after Hamas participation in the Palestinian elections that Hamas won and became part of the Palestinian Government.

Netanyahu expresses his refusal to deal with a Palestinian government that Hamas participates in. Yet, Netanyahu does not mention Hamas explicitly, but he refers to Hamas as the “Palestinian version of al-Qaeda”. Netanyahu expresses his ideas in an implicit manner; all of the implicatures were I-implicature and in the case of **inference to stereotype**. That is, the only possible party that corresponds to Netanyahu’s words is Hamas; then, Hamas, prototypically, is the Palestinian version of Al-Qaeda. Netanyahu implicates that:

- 1- +> Hamas is the Palestinian version of al-Qaeda.
- 2- +> Hamas is holding the same fanatic ideology of al-Qaeda
- 3- +> Netanyahu refuses Hamas being part of a Palestinian government.

The political background of the audience, or the interpreter, will determine Netanyahu's implicated messages without any effort. Netanyahu is attacking Hamas for holding a fanatic ideology and refuses its participation in a Palestinian government. The interpretation should reflect the implicated messages adequately since Netanyahu's attack is directed toward a certain party, Hamas. Any miscommunication of the original meaning will distort the whole message.

The interpreter omitted parts of the original message, the "Palestinian version of al-Qaeda", which is Hamas. Such omission left no trace for the audience to follow in order to grasp Netanyahu's intentions in attacking Hamas. The audience will find Netanyahu's attack directed toward the Palestinian government. The interpreter did not specify which side is backed by or part of Al-Qaeda, Hamas or the Palestinian government, while Netanyahu sign Al-Qaeda support to Hamas only. The interpreter would create a political crisis if taken seriously. The claim that the Palestinian government is supported by al-Qaeda has no reference within the source message or in the conventional political background of the audience. Netanyahu is accusing Hamas, only, by being part of al-Qaeda, or holding the same ideology of al-Qaeda.

The interpreter failed to capture the implicated message and produced an interpretation that is distinct from the original. The deficiency can be attributed to linguistic knowledge, socio-cultural factors and the interpreter's background. For the linguistic knowledge, the interpreters must be controlled by his/her commitment to the source message content, which reflects the text purpose. The socio-cultural factor is violated by providing an interpretation that can negatively affect the audience and provoke the audience's reaction; that is, the interpretation shows that Netanyahu is accusing the Palestinian government of being fanatic. The interpreter's background should have aid him a lot in this situation; that is, the tension between Hamas and Israel was stated obviously in every speech by Netanyahu. The interpreter should have singled out the intended party by Netanyahu's words.

The interpreter does not betray the original meaning by misinterpreting it only; but also diverted the meaning and presented new implications. The interpreter's omission, or over-minimization, results from his/her misestimating of the consequences of omission on the original meaning preservation. The lack of proficiency in the interpreter's sociolinguistic competence provided an unaccepted interpretation. That is, the interpretation contradicts the political culture of the audience , the Arabs.

## **M-implicatures**

The M-implicature, according to precedence schema by Levinson (1991,2000), has a precedence over the I-implicature. That is, when M-implicatures and I-implicature arise together in the same utterance, the focus will be shed upon the M-implicature.

Dimensions of contrast in M-implicature may involve prototype versus non-prototype, intensifiers versus non-intensifiers, literal versus metaphorical meaning, resolving reference, disambiguating expressions and narrowing generalities. Marked forms, according to Levinson (2000), have connotations or other meanings that do not appear in their unmarked counterparts.

The non-prototypical use of certain forms can indicate the existence of M-implicature. For example:

- Cortes caused the death of Montezuma.

M-implicature +> Cortes indirectly caused the death of Montezuma, e.g., he ordered him to be put to death. (Levinson, 2000:160)

The M-implicature is located in the abnormal use of “caused the death” rather than the normal form “killed”. Yet, the use of such an abnormal form indicates a deeper underlying message, which is the M-implicature “indirectly caused the death”.



Another case of M-implicature can be located in the use of intensifiers. The use of intensifiers communicates the unexpectedness through strengthening the neutral, less marked and more expected forms to show emphasis. Abuarrah (2016) provided examples on the use of emphatic forms:

(a) Hearty reception

+ > extraordinary reception

(b) Generous hospitability

+ > abnormal hospitability

Moreover, metaphors or the metaphorical use of language generates M-implicatures (cf. Huang:2017:64). The hindrances that metaphorical meaning pose are related to the M-heuristic greatly. That is, saying something indirectly, abnormally and by using other words seems to be related to the speaker's part in the M-heuristic, which results in producing marked forms. The audiences' role is to locate the abnormality of the metaphor. Dynel and Cap (2017:170) introduced the next example on metaphorical meaning interpretation:

- Because of Waco and the Branch Davidson, the Federal government was walking on eggshells to not repeat that experiences. (Interview with Jeff Nicholls, April 2016)

The speaker expressed his intentions in a marked way. The speaker used an abnormal form to indicate another, intended message. The example implicates that:

+> the Federal government acted with extreme caution.

The first example is retrieved from the American former president Barak Obama speech in his final State of the Union on January 12, 2016. The second and third examples are selected from the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu speech to a joint session of the US Congress on May 24, 2011.

### Example (1):

Obama: “It’s one of the few regrets of my presidency — that the rancor and suspicion between the parties **has gotten worse instead of better.**”

The interpreter: " هذه إحدى الأشياء التي أسف عليها في رئاستي، إن هذا الاقتتال **وجود** بين الأحزاب "الأحزاب"

Back translation: this is one of the things that I regret in my presidency, that the fight **occurs between the parties**

Obama is trying to comment on the current bad relation between the American parties. Obama is forming his words in a marked way, that is, “**has gotten worse instead of better**”. It is a **non- prototypical form**. The prototypical form can be “**has gotten worse**” since there is no need to say

that when things have gotten worse, they have not gotten better. However, Obama is trying to implicate that:

+> rancor and suspicions that have gotten worse between the parties are abnormal, and the rancor and suspicions should get better.

The interpretation suffers a great deal of distortion from the original message. The interpreter misinterprets the whole utterance, and he/she could not reflect the intended message that Obama is trying to communicate. Obama is regretting the rancor and suspicions getting worse instead of better is lost in the interpretation. The interpretation suggests that “ان هذا الاقتتال موجود بين الاحزاب”, which means that “the rancor exists between the parties”. Such interpretation does not reflect Obama’s intended aim of his words. In other words, Obama is not trying to show the existence of rancor, but to illustrate its current status in being worse.

The interpreter’s role is in identifying the marked form that is used to identify the marked situation. The interpreter failed to capture the marked form that illustrates the marked situation. The non-prototypical use of “**has gotten worse instead of better**” was not interpreted in a way that reflects the existence of a marked form; such misinterpreting resulted in the loss in the meaning that the marked form was employed to recover. Therefore, the interpretation distorted the original message and the speaker’s purpose. The interpreter’s deficiency lies in the illocutionary competence. That is, the interpreter misinterprets the original text in which the abnormality of the utterance and its implications were lost.

**(Example 2):**

Netanyahu: “Mr. Vice President, **do you remember the time we were the new kids in town**(2)?<sup>1</sup>”

the interpreter:

"السيد نائب الرئيس اذا تذكرت الوقت الذي — عندما كنا اطفالا في هذه المدينة" <sup>2</sup>

back translation: Mr. Vice President, if you remember the time when we were kids in this town

Netanyahu intends to point out the deep and old relation between him and the American vice president, Joe Biden.

The implicature is in Netanyahu’s saying “we were the new kids in town”. The utterance used by Netanyahu can pose as a challenge for the interpreter in its recognition as I or M implicature; that is, if the utterance is understood stereotypically by the audience, the interpreter’s role is to produce the minimal linguistic forms; yet, if the implicature is a M-implicature, the interpreter needs to identify the marked situation that the marked form used to indicate; also the audience’s role will be identifying the use of an abnormal form to identify the marked situation. If the interpreter identifies the implicature stereotypically, literally, the utterance will implicate that:

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pOs99OZN1g>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhf61vRNH80>

I-implicature +> they met when they were the newly coming kids at the same town (undefined town)

On the other hand, if the implicature is defined as M-implicature, if Netanyahu is using his words metaphorically, it would be:

M-implicature +> they met when they were juniors (at work)

At this point, the interpreter's political background is going to decide whether to go for I or M implicature. The interpreter considered the literal meaning which implicates that:

+> they, Netanyahu and Vice President, were kids in this town "city" (Washington)

It is obvious that it is not an easy task to tackle the implicated meaning from the linguistic constituents only. If we moved to the extralinguistic information, background of the addressor, Netanyahu, and the addressee, Biden, we would find out that they have met nearly 27 years ago, when Biden was 49 years old. According to Hoffman (2016) **"Netanyahu and Biden first met when the future prime minister was a diplomat at Israel's embassy in Washington."**<sup>1</sup> Then, they did not meet when they were kids and Netanyahu is using his words metaphorically to point their relation when they were juniors. The second implicature, M-

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahus-prediction-of-Biden-presidency-25-years-ago-447393>

implicature, “+> they met when they were juniors” is the intended one by Netanyahu and is the one that should be conveyed.

The interpreter failed to capture the implicated meaning, and adhered to the literal meaning of Netanyahu’s words. The interpreter’s failure is at the extralinguistic competence, encyclopedic knowledge specifically, when the interpreter’s political background could not aid him in realizing the relation between Netanyahu and Biden. In addition, the interpreter failed at the linguistic level when he could not recognize the use of metaphor by the speaker. The interpreter's failure, whether at the linguistic or extralinguistic level, caused a loss in the original intended meaning of the utterance. In other words, presenting the literal meaning for the metaphorical one creates a loss in the function that the speaker employed the metaphor for.

### (Example 3):

Netanyahu: “the **Ayatollah** regime briefly suspended its nuclear program only once, in 2003, when it feared the possibility of military action”

The interpreter:

" ان النظائ الايراني علق بشكل موجز برنامجہ النووي مرة واحدة في العائ 2003 عندما كان يخشى توجيه ضربة عسكرية له"

Back translation: the **Iranian regime** briefly suspended its nuclear program only once in 2003 when it feared a military strike.

Netanyahu's attack on Iranian regime and its plans to obtain nuclear weapons, according to Netanyahu, is present in all of his speeches. Netanyahu is trying to picture the devil in Iran's acts in any suitable way. In this quotation, Netanyahu used a marked form that carries connotations other than using the unmarked form; the usage of "the **Ayatollah** regime", rather than the "Iranian regime", was chosen by Netanyahu to implicate a certain message. Finding out the meaning of "Ayatollah" can illustrate Netanyahu's implicated message. According to Merriam Webster online dictionary, **Ayatollah** is "a religious leader among Shiite Muslims —used as a title of respect especially for one who is not an imam"<sup>1</sup>. Netanyahu use of the marked form "**Ayatollah** regime" has other implications than the unmarked "Iranian regime". There are few possible options for Netanyahu's intended message, but all of them revolve around the idea of demonization Iran's religious leaders. Netanyahu implicates that:

+>Iran's bad intentions is connected to its religious background and its religious leaders.

+> Netanyahu is accusing the religious leader, Ayatollah, for all of Iran's acts .

Since the Iranian regime is Ayatollah's regime, Netanyahu implicates that: +> Ayatollah controls Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ayatollah>

These implications should be reflected to the audience by the interpreter. The interpreter interpreted “Ayatollah regime” as “النظام الإيراني”, which means “the Iranian regime”. Linguistically, ‘Ayatollah regime’ is a metonymy of the ‘Iranian regime’. Metonymies are used figuratively to indicate implicated message. The interpreter has a deficiency in his linguistic competence in which he could not capture the function of the figurative use of the linguistic item. Yet, the interpreter adheres to the literal meaning which creates the loss of the impact that the speaker intends.

The next examples are retrieved from the American president Donald Trump’s speech for his first State of the Union address on Jan 30, 2018. It was the third-longest State of the Union in history, lasting for an hour and 21 minutes.<sup>1</sup> Trump praised the Cajun Navy, firefighters, police officers and others who provided assistance to Americans in tough times, whether during hurricanes, fire or other difficult occasions. Trump’s speech included a diversity of topics like economy improvement in the areas of employment, investments and income. Moreover, Trump referred medical care and violence beside other topics.

Trump used a lot of intensifiers, which can be regarded as marked forms, in his speech. The intensifiers’ recognition as marked forms rises from the fact that the use of intensifiers carries other meanings, or

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/30/16953472/state-of-the-union-transcript>



connotations, than the one associated with the unmarked forms. Next, examples on intensifiers and their interpretation are presented below:

**(Example1):**

Trump: “Over the last year, we have made **incredible(1)** progress and achieved **extraordinary(1)** success.”<sup>1</sup>

The interpreter:

"وفي السنة الماضية قمنا بإحراز **تقد** هائل وحققنا نجاحات"<sup>2</sup>

Back translation: and in the last year we achieved massive progress and achieved successes.

It can be stated that the use of intensifiers, whether positively or negatively, is to emphasize and stress a certain idea by the speaker. Trump used “**incredible** progress”, which was interpreted as “**تقد** هائل”, as an intensifier to stress the amount of progress as being “incredible”, that is:

“We have made incredible progress”

This implicates+> beyond belief or abnormal, positive, progress

Trump is trying to convince the addressees of his wise presidency by presenting his administration achievements as abnormal. The interpreter succeeded in rendering trump’s intended meaning by providing an intensifier in his interpretation, which is “هائل” (massive). The interpreter

<sup>1</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4AcUO0\\_Jlw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4AcUO0_Jlw)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4FmQtOPbF4>

preserved the effect that Trump is trying to achieve; he provided a corresponding interpretation for the original marked form and succeeded to transform the marked form's effect from the speaker, Trump, to the Arab audience. However, the second occurrence of the intensifier "extraordinary" did not get the same treatment. Trump used the intensifier "extraordinary" to describe the success that his administration achieved over the last year. Trump used a marked expression to express a marked situation, which is the abnormal success that his administration achieved. "And achieved extraordinary success" implicates that:

+> trump's administration achieved an abnormal success

The extraordinary success was interpreted as "نجاحات", which means "successes". Such interpreting omitted the intensifier "extraordinary" and provided an unmarked form, which carries no intensifier. However, the interpreter's misinterpretation can be assigned to a lack of pragmatic competence, illocutionary competence precisely. That is, the interpreter fails to appreciate the function of the intensifier in the source text and produces an interpretation that does not carry the same impact.

**(Example 2):**

Trump: "children trapped at a California summer camp threatened by those devastating wildfires."

The interpreter:

"وكانوا مهددين من هذه النيران"

Back translation: and they were threatened by those fires

The speaker, Trump, is trying to describe the fires that the children were trapped in in order to indicate the heroism of the firefighter David Dahlberg who rescued 60 children. What Trump is trying to present by using the marked form “devastating” is obvious. That is, the firefighter heroism is shown in rescuing 60 children from a devastating wildfire, not any fire, but a devastating one . Then, Trump’s words implicated that:

+> the wildfires were abnormally wild.

The context plays a great role in identifying Trump’s intentions. The heroism of the firefighter is stressed by stressing the danger that children were facing. The interpreter should provide an interpretation that can reflect the purpose of the speaker’s words. That is, the same emphasis must provide the same effect of the intensifier in the original text in his interpretation. The interpreter omitted the intensifier and did not stress the abnormality of the wildfire; in other words, the interpreter lost the markedness of the wildfire. Such loss is an obvious failure of the original message intended purpose. The failure emerges from the interpreters lack of pragmatic competence in which he failed to convey the function of the intensifier of the source text

**(Example 3):**

Trump: “And it's very, very unfair”.

The interpreter:

"وهذا غير منصف"

Back translation: and that's unfair

Trump is describing buying drugs in high prices, comparing other countries, as being “very, very unfair”. Trump’s use of the intensifier very, twice, implicates that:

Buying drugs in high prices is +> extraordinarily, or extremely unfair.

Trump is trying to communicate his administration policies considering health care. That is, The drugs prices that he is attacking are part of his propaganda to show the importance of reducing drugs prices. The markedness of the utterance is justified by the speaker’s intentions. Yet, the interpreter’s act is what we are concerned with; the interpreter’s role here is to identify the markedness in the text and elaborate the situation involved. The interpreter did not provide any correspondence to the intensifier “very”. Moreover, the interpreter adhered to the unmarked form of the utterance, which does not carry the same connotations. The interpreter’s interpretation “وهذا غير منصف”, translated as “and that’s unfair” lacks the extra abnormal effect by the speaker. The interpreter’s lack of pragmatic knowledge caused such failure. the interpreter does not appreciate the role of using intensifiers and its impact.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **6.1 Conclusions**

#### **6.2 Recommendations**

## **Chapter Six**

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **6.1 Conclusions**

The research's aim is to look into implicature interpreting in SI. More specifically, the research's first aim is to identify the challenges that face the interpreter and how interpreters can overcome such challenges. The second aim is to identify the impact of misinterpreting implicature on meaning. Finally, the research aims to look into the elements that are involved and can affect, implicature interpreting.

The effects of misinterpretation implicatures vary. The misinterpretation may alter the intended implicated message by replacing it with another that does not reflect the original content. Such alteration constitutes a betrayal of the source, which deforms the original message. Moreover, misinterpretation can occur when the interpreter alters the intended implicature by another unintended one. In this case, the interpreter miscommunicates the original message and creates another message that can produce new different implications.

SI process is affected by linguistic and extralinguistic elements. Such elements interact in a network of relationships. Linguistic choices are made of the interpreter's understanding, which can be determined by his/her linguistic and/or extralinguistic knowledge. Most of the interpreter's misinterpretations of implicature were related to a deficiency in

interpreter's linguistic knowledge. In most cases the interpreter failed to realize the pragmatic function of certain linguistic forms where implicatures arise. The linguistic element occupies the prominent place among other related elements.

More specifically, he researches answers the raised questions as follows:

- 1- The researcher concludes that each kind of the implicature has certain challenges:
  - Q-implicatures: The interpreters' challenge is in reflecting the level of strength used in the source text. Such challenge will be located in the choice of the appropriate equivalence for the source language form. Interpreters' lack of linguistic competence, semantic and textual competencies is mainly the reason for the interpreters' misinterpretation of Q-implicatures.
  - I-implicatures: this type of implicature is based on the ability of the audience to catch the implicated message stereotypically. The interpreters' challenge lies in the lack of pragmatic competence, which includes illocutionary and sociolinguistic competencies.
  - M-implicature: the stating of abnormal, marked, expression is the core of the M-implicatures. The challenge in this type of implicatures is located in the interpreters' identification of the marked form and the situation it indicates. The deficiency in

textual competence caused the failure in capturing the abnormality of an utterance. Moreover, the lack of pragmatic competence, illocutionary in particular, stands as the main reason for the interpreters' failure to appreciate the pragmatic effect when omitting the abnormal item that carries implicated message.

It can be stated that interpreters failure in interpreting implicature is a consequence of their lack of linguistic competency.

Interpreters can overcome the challenges by: firstly, expanding linguistic knowledge on implicated meanings production, pragmatic function and its categorizations. Expanding the interpreter's linguistic knowledge, for both source and target languages, aids interpreters in the conveyance of implicated meanings. The interpreter's recognition of implicatures helps in grasping implicature in first place.

The effect of misinterpretation an implicature can be noticed according to the kind of misinterpretation. Misinterpretation can occur in three ways: the first way is when the interpreter interprets part of the implicated message, in this case, the original message, which implicature is part of, will be partially lost, as a result, the audience will take the presented misinterpretation as the source of information, which leads to the loss of the original intended message. The second misinterpretation can be when the interpreter omits the whole original form that carries the



implicated meanings. In such case, the interpreter's betrayal is for the source text content and implicated meanings will be lost. The third misinterpretation can occur when the interpreter produces new implicature(s) in the target text. That is, misinterpretation occurs when the interpreter's interpretation carries implications that are distinct from the existed in the original text. Misinterpreting implicature in the third case diverts the content of the original text and "make the speaker say" rather than interpret the speaker's words.

- 2- There are number of elements that can affect implicature interpreting in SI. The skopos "purpose" of source text, which is determined by other cognitive elements, constitutes a determiner for the speaker's purpose other cognitive, extralinguistic, elements can assess the translator in his attempts to unravel the implicated meanings. The linguistic element occupies the first position; that is, the linguistic knowledge that the interpreter holds is his number one priority.

The Q- implicature is related to certain linguistic items that are governed by a scale of strength. Interpreting Q-implicatures depends on the interpreter linguistic knowledge. That is, interpreting Q-implicatures is related to the interpreters' adequate and direct transference of the linguistic item. M-implicatures' interpreting relies on the interpreters' textual abilities to locate the abnormal use

of items and the illocutionary abilities to go beyond the word and dissolve the abnormal situation.

However, the I-implicature depends mainly on the pragmatic abilities of the interpreter and the audience, since there are no linguistic forms that can lead to I-implicature indication.

## **6.2 Recommendations:**

The research recommends the following: The training of interpreters should focus on the linguistic frame; that is, interpreters need to have training on implicatures' pragmatic function, as one of the fundamental conditions of SI success. Interpreters' training should focus on the illocutionary competence which stands as one of the main competencies that are necessary for message communication. Interpreters' training should consider their textual competence as a base for their interpreting success.

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جامعة النجاح الوطنية  
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## المعنى الضمني في الترجمة الفورية

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قدمت هذه الأطروحة استكمالاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الماجستير في اللغويات التطبيقية والترجمة بكلية الدراسات العليا في جامعة النجاح الوطنية، نابلس، فلسطين.

2018

ب

## المعنى الضمني في الترجمة الفورية

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## الملخص

يتناول هذا البحث ترجمة المعنى الضمني في الترجمة الفورية حيث يشكل المعنى الضمني جزءا من الرسالة التي يجدر بالمرجم ان ينقلها ليتمكن من ايصال الرسالة الاصلية بشكل ملائم. تعتبر عملية الترجمة الفورية تحديًا بسبب طبيعتها الفورية الشفهية؛ علاوةً على ذلك، تشكل الرسالة الضمنية تحديًا إضافيًا لهذه العملية نظرًا لأن المعنى الضمني يُقصد بدلاً من ان يُقال. تهدف هذه الرسالة إلى تحديد التحديات التي يواجهها المترجمون الفوريون أثناء ترجمة المعنى الضمني. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يسعى البحث إلى التعرف على التفسيرات الخاطئة للمعاني الضمنية وتأثيرها على نقل الرسالة. تهدف الدراسة أيضا إلى النظر في العناصر التي يمكن أن تساعد المترجمين الفوريين في تفسير المعنى الضمني. يتبع البحث المنهج الوصفي والتحليلي. يتم استخدام المنهج الوصفي في تحديد العوامل التي تؤثر على تفسير المعنى الضمني في الترجمة الفورية. ويشمل الجزء التحليلي من البحث تحليل الأمثلة العملية التي تتضمن معانٍ ضمنية في الترجمة الفورية من خلال تطبيق تصنيف ليفنسون للمعنى الضمني (الكمي، الإخباري والاسلوبي). وُجد أن التحدي الأكبر للمترجم هو استيعاب الرسالة الضمنية بحد ذاتها. يمكن للمترجمين أن يتغلبوا على هذا التحدي بطريقتين مختلفتين. أولاً ، يجب على المترجم أن يوسع معرفته اللغوية ومعرفته بالوظيفة البراغمية للمعاني الضمنية. وبالنظر إلى النوع الكمي، يجب أن يعكس المترجمون مستوى القوة المستخدمة في النص المصدر. يتحقق عكس مستوى القوة في اختيار المعنى المساوي المناسب لصيغة اللغة المصدر في النوع الإخباري، وهو الأكثر تحديًا نظرًا لكونه لا يرتبط بتعبيرات أو قوالب لغوية معينة، يحتاج المترجمون الشفويون إلى توفير المقدار الدقيق من المعلومات الأصلية التي يوفرها المتحدث الأصلي بحيث يتيح هذا للجمهور العثر على قاعدة لتوسيع الرسالة الأصلية

والوصول إلى الرسالة الضمنية. يقع التحدي في النوع الاسلوبي في تحديد المترجمين الفوريين للصيغة المخالفة والموقف الذي يشير إليه. ثانياً، يجب أن يمتلك المترجم خلفية كافية عن العناصر غير اللغوية لعملية الترجمة الفورية. أي أن المعرفة العامة للمترجمين وخلفيتهم الثقافية وخلفيتهم الاجتماعية-الثقافية تشكل جزءاً من المعرفة الأساسية التي ينبغي أن يمتلكها المترجمون. توصي الدراسة بأن يركز تدريب المترجمين على الإطار اللغوي. أي أن المترجم يحتاج إلى التدريب على الوظيفة البراغماتية للمعنى الضمني، كواحد من الشروط الأساسية لنجاح عملية الترجمة الفورية.